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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MILITARY DETERMINATIONS AND
THE EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES REQUIREMENT
Edward F. Sherman*
IVILIAN courts have traditionally acknowledged that they lack
jurisdiction to interfere with determinations by the military concerning its own personnel. It has been asserted that this doctrine is
required by the Constitution's delegation of powers over the armed
forces to the executive and legislative branches" and by the need for
military autonomy in maintaining internal discipline and order.2 Buttressed by a line of Supreme Court decisions spanning the last hundred
years, the doctrine was reaffirmed in 1962 by Chief Justice Warren
in an address devoted to examining the principles of military justice:
[I]t is indisputable that the tradition of our country, from the time
of the Revolution until now, has supported the military establishment's broad power to deal with its own personnel. The most obvious
reason is that courts are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon
discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might
have.3
Despite the fact that the military has continued to enjoy relative
autonomy over determinations affecting its own personnel, several
areas have been carved out in which federal court review is permitted,
particularly involving claims of denial of constitutional rights during
the course of courts-martia 4 and discharge proceedingsY The Vietnam
"War has resulted in a rash of new suits challenging the doctrine of
*A.B., 1959, Georgetown University; M.A., 1967, University of Texas at El
Paso, LL.B., 1962, Harvard University; Teaching Fellow, Harvard Law School, 196769; Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, 1969-70. Mr.
Sherman served in the United States Army from 1965 to 1967 and holds a commission
in the United States Army Reserve, Judge Advocate General's Corps.
1 See W. WiNTRop, MILITARY LAW AND PREcmENTs 49 (2d ed. 1920).
2
See Barker, Military Law-A Separate System of Jurisprudence, 36 U. GIN. L.
REv. 223 (1967); Fratcher, Review by the Civil Courts of Judgments of Federal Military
Tribunals, 10 Omo ST. L.J. 271 (1949); Comment, God, The Army, and Judicial Review: The In-Service Conscientious Objector, 56 CrrA. L. REv. 379 (1968).
3
Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.UL. REv. 181, 187 (1962).
4 E.g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
5 E.g., Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (per curiam).
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nonreviewability by attempting to obtain federal court relief from a
variety of military determinations. Suits have been filed in the last two
years to require a discharge on the grounds that the military improperly
determined conscientious objector status," medical fitness,7 and personal
hardship,8 to declare void the activation of reserve and national guard
units9 and individuals,' to prevent transfer of units"' and individuals 2
6 E.g., Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968); Brown v. McNamara, 387
F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1005 (1968), aff'g 263 F. Supp. 686
(D.N.J. 1967); Noyd v. McNamara, 378 F.2d 538 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1022, aff'g 267 F. Supp. 701 (D. Colo. 1967); Cooper v. Barker, 291 F. Supp. 952 (D. Md.
1968); Gann v. Wilson, 289 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
7E.g., Petition of Bank, 290 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Weber v. Clifford, 289
F. Supp. 960 (D. Md. 1968); Rank v. Gleszer, 288 F. Supp. 174 (D. Colo. 1968).
8E.g., United States ex tel. Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371 (2d
Cir. 1968), reconsiderationof denial of stay denied, 89 S. Ct. 609 (1969) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
9
E.g., Felberbaum v. MacLaughlin, 402 F.2d 57 (4th Cir. 1968); McArthur v. Clifford,
402 F.2d 58 (8th Cir.), stay denied, 393 U.S. 810, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1002 (1968)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Morse v. Boswell, 401 F.2d 544 (4th Cir.), stay denied, 393
U.S. 802 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 687 (1969) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); McAbee v. Martinez, 291 F. Supp. 77 (D. Md.), injunctive relief
denied, 393 U.S. 904 (1968); Sullivan v. Cushman, 290 F. Supp. 659 (D. Mass. 1968)
(three-judge court) (unsuccessful action by army reservists to prevent activation and
orders to Vietnam on grounds of violation of reserve contract and denial of due
process for failure to provide individual hardship hearings), stay denied, 393 U.S. 810
(1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Linsalata v. Clifford, 290 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);

Goldstein v. Clifford, 290 F. Supp. 275 (D.N.J. 1968).
1oE.g., Fox v. Brown, 402 F.2d 837 (2d Cir.), aff'g 286 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);

Weber v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Even v. Clifford, 287 F.
Supp. 334 (S.D. Cal. 1968); Winters v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.Y.),
aff'd per curian, 390 F.2d 879 (2d Cir.), stay denied, 390 U.S. 993, reconsideration of
denial of stay denied, 391 U.S. 910, cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 188 (1968) (unsuccessful
action to prevent ordering to active duty for noncompliance with reserve obligations
on grounds contract obligations changed); Winters v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 57
(1968) (stay granted by Justice Douglas to prevent reactivation second time pending
decision on merits by 9th Cir.); Ali v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 530 (C.D. Cal.
1968); Gion v. McNamara, Civil No. 76-1563-EC (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1969) (order to
active duty for more than 45 days because of unsatisfactory participation in reserves

held in violation of contract and constitutional rights).
"1E.g., Morse v. Boswell, 401 F.2d 544 (4th Cir.), stay denied, 393 U.S. 802 (1968)
(Douglas, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 687 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
McAbee v. Martinez, 291 F. Supp. 77 (D. Md.), injunctive relief denied, 393 U.S. 904
(1968); Sullivan v. Cushman, 290 F. Supp. 659 (D. Mass. 1968); Johnson v. Powell, 89 S.
Ct. 250 (1968) (application for stay denied) (Douglas, J., dissenting, objecting that
National Guard petitioners were "spirited out of the country" to Vietnam by military
and thereby deprived of hearing).
12 Smith v. Ritchey, 89 S. Ct. 54 (1968) (stay granted) (stay issued by Douglas, J.,
to prevent transfer of serviceman to Formosa under orders issued after he organized
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overseas, to rescind orders concerning duty assignments,'2 and to
prevent the court-martial of servicemen. 14 Most of these suits have
foundered on the threshold question of jurisdiction, with federal courts
denying jurisdiction in reliance on the traditional doctrine of non-

reviewability or on a finding that the complainant failed to exhaust
military remedies. However, last June a decision was handed down
by the Second Circuit which appears to have made a significant
breach in the old nonreviewability doctrine and to have liberalized the
requirement of exhaustion of remedies. In Hammond v. Lenfest,"'
the Second Circuit reversed the district court's determination that it

lacked jurisdiction to consider a reservist's application for a writ of
habeas corpus, and ordered him discharged from the Navy unless
evidence was introduced at rehearing to provide a basis in fact for
denial of his request for a conscientious objector discharge. 6 In holding
that a serviceman is entitled to federal court review of a military
administrative determination concerning a request for discharge, without requiring that he exhaust his military remedies through a courtmartial proceeding, the Second Circuit rejected the stringent exhaustion
peace march); Earl v. Cushman, Misc. Civil No. 68-1164-J (D. Mass. Dec. 18, 1968)
(denial of temporary restraining order to prevent shipment of officer to Vietnam, such
shipment allegedly in violation of Army regulation that he must be retained in unit upon
filing application for conscientious objector discharge); Bates v. Commanding Officer,
Misc. Civil No. 68-64-F (D. Mass. Oct. 29, 1968) (habeas corpus action to require discharge on grounds no basis in fact for denial of conscientious objector status resulting in voluntary return of petitioner by military to jurisdiction of district
court pending court determination and appeal), rev'd, No. 7241 (1st Cir. Jan. 7, 1969),
'writ denied on remand, Misc. Civil No. 68-64-F (D. Mass. March 14, 1969), appeal
pending No. 7315 (1st Cir. 1969).
13E.g., Noyd v. McNamara, 378 F.2d 538 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022,
aff'g 267 F. Supp. 701 (D. Colo. 1967); Noyd v. Bond, 402 F.2d 441 (10th Cir.), ree'g 285
F. Supp. 785 (D.N.M.), non-incarcerated status granted, 89 S. Ct. 478 (1968), cert.
granted,89 S. Ct. 692 (1969).
14 E.g., In re Kelly, 401 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1968); Levy v. McNamara, Civil No.
953-67 (D.D.C. May 9, 1967), aff'd sub nom. Levy v. Corcoran, 389 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.)
(Bazelon, J., dissenting), stay denied, 387 U.S. 915, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 960 (1967)
(unsuccessful attempt to convene three-judge court and enjoin convening of courtmartial on grounds of chilling effect on first amendment rights).
1.5398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968).
16 Two and a half months after its decision in Hammond, the Second Circuit issued
a new per curiam opinion on petition for rehearing. The court stated that because
the armed services had adopted new regulations concerning discharge of conscientious
objectors, the case should be sent back to the Department of the Navy to be processed in
accordance with the new regulations. 398 F.2d 705, 718 (2d Cir. 1968). For discussion
of the effect of this order upon the original opinion, see text at note 202 infra.
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rule which had been adopted in recent decisions by other circuits. 17
Other courts have now followed Hammond by accepting jurisdiction
in both conscientious objector discharge 8 and non-discharge cases.' 9
This article will re-examine the doctrine that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review military determinations concerning personnel in light
of Hammond and its progeny, and will consider what standards are
now required for reviewability.
HISTORICAL BASIS FOR DENIAL OF FEbERAL COURT
JURISDICTION TO REVIEw MILITARY DETERMINATIONS

A military determination affecting personnel can be made either by a

court-martial decision or a non-court administrative determination. The
historical development of nonreviewability differs somewhat between
the two categories.
Review of Court-MartialDecisions
With respect to review of court-martial decisions, American law has
followed the English concept that military courts provide an autonomous system of jurisprudence which, due to the exigencies of military
life and the necessity for discipline, should not be interfered with by
the civil authorities.20 Article I, section 8 of the Constitution gives
Congress the power to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces." It is this clause, together with the
other legislative and executive powers over the armed forces, 21 that
has served as a basis for the holding that the military courts are not
17 See Brown v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1967), caert. denied, 390 U.S. 1005
(1968), af'g 263 F. Supp. 686 (D.N.J. 1967); Noyd v. McNamara, 378 F.2d 538 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022, aff'g 267 F. Supp. 701 (D. Colo. 1967).
18 Cooper v. Barker, 291 F. Supp. 952 (D. Md. 1968); Gann v. Wilson, 289 F. Supp.
191 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Mandel v. Dayton, Civil No. 68-2695 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1968).
19 Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969) (habeas corpus to prevent activation
resulting from unsatisfactory attendance ratings on account of long hair despite regulations permitting it); In re Kelly, 401 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1968).
2
o See W. WNmhooP, MmiTARY LAw AND PRE CEDENTS 49 (2d ed. 1920). See generally
Comment, God, the Army, and Judicial Resdew: The In-Service Conscientious Objector,
supra note 2, which contains an excellent discussion of the nonreviewability doctrine.
21 U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2 provides: "The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States ... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 gives
Congress the power: "To declare War . . . To raise and support Armies . . . To

provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces .... "
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Article III courts, but are agencies of the executive branch established
pursuant to Articles I and II. 2 Furthermore, Dynes v. Hoover established in the mid-nineteenth century that the civil courts have no power
to interfere with courts-martial and that court-martial decisions are
not subject to civil court review. The Supreme Court also eschewed
jurisdiction to review by writ of certiorari the proceedings of a military
commission.2 4
The unavailability of civil court review of court-martial decisions
did not, however, extend to habeas corpus jurisdiction. Indeed, the
policy reasons for preserving federal habeas corpus jurisdiction as a last
remedy for a petitioner in unlawful custody2- were as ancient and
compelling as the policy of noninterference with the military, and when
the two interests collided, habeas corpus was the victor.26 By the latter
part of the nineteenth century, it had been established that habeas
corpus was the exclusive means of obtaining review of military determinations,ar a doctrine which has only recently been modified to permit
collateral review based on federal question jurisdiction, declaratory
28
judgment, and mandamus.
22

Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65
(1858); Ex parte Dickey, 204 F. 322 (D. Me. 1913); United States v. Maney, 61 F. 140
(C.C.D. Minn. 1894).
23 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858).
24 Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864).
25 Habeas Corpus was termed the "great writ" in Justice Marshall's day, Ex parte
Boilman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807), and has often been called "'the great writ of
liberty'," Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 148 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.); Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963). See C. Wmusr, FEDERAL COUirS 177-186 (1963).
26 In Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), the Supreme Court held that
federal courts have habeas corpus jurisdiction to examine unlawful detention imposed
by court-martial. After this decision, Congress passed the Act of March 27, 1868, ch.
34, 15 Stat. 44, removing appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases from the
Supreme Court, apparently in an attempt to remove the opportunity of the Court to
invalidate the reconstruction military governments' provisions. See J. BURGESS, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 197 (1902); 2 C. WARREN, THE SuPv tEM
COURT rN
UNITED STATES HisroRy 455 (1937 ed.); Wooldridge, Book Review, 55 VA. L. REv. 569
(1969). The Act was upheld in Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), but
was later held to leave intact the power of the Supreme Court to review denial of a
writ of habeas corpus on a petition for certiorari. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
85 (1869).

See H. M. HART & H.

WECHSLER,

THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL

SYsTEhi 290-94 (1953).
27 See Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
28
" Federal question" jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964), would appear
to provide the vehicle for federal court jurisdiction in most cases challenging a
military determination, provided that the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000. Other
bases for jurisdiction are mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964), Ashe v.
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The scope of habeas corpus review of military determinations has
always been severely restricted. It was originally limited to cases of
actual confinement2 9 and restricted to the issue of whether the courtmartial had jurisdiction over the person tried and the offense charged.3 °
However, since habeas corpus review could inquire into the lawfulness
of military jurisdiction over the person, it was early held that the writ
would lie to obtain the release or discharge of one unlawfully inducted.1
Thus, habeas corpus actions have been used to obtain the release of a
petitioner who refused to take the oath of induction on the grounds that
he was never lawfully subject to military jurisdiction 32 and, in recent
cases, to secure discharge where a draft board wrongfully denied an
34
exempt classification, 33 failed to follow proper induction procedures,
or gave erroneous and misleading information concerning the right
35
to appeal a classification.
McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965); declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (1964) and FED. R. Civ. P. 57, Gallagher v. Quinn, 363 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881 (1966); suit for back pay in the Court of Claims, Augenblick v.
United States, 377 F.2d 586 (Ct. Cl. 1967), rev'd, 89 S. Ct. 528 (1969) (leaves open
question whether collateral attack on court-martial judgments may be made in the Court
of Claims). Injunctive relief is sought under FED. R. CIw. P. 65 and the general equity
jurisdiction of the federal courts. It is uncertain whether the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (Supp. II, 1967), amending 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964), applies to the
military. See United States ex rel. Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371,
375 n.2 (2d Cir. 1968), reconsiderationof denial of stay denied, 89 S. Ct. 609 (1969);
Jaffe, The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 12 BuFF. L. REv. 327, 327-34 (1963).
29 Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885); United States ex rel. McKiever v. Jack,
351 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1965); Petition of Green, 156 F. Supp. 174 (S.D. Cal. 1957),
appeal dismissed as moot, 264 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1959). But see United States ex rel.
Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371, 373 (2d Cir. 1968), reconsideration
of denial of stay denied, 89 S. Ct. 609 (1969); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705,
710-12 (2d Cir. 1968); Ex parte Fabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1952); United
States ex rel. Steinberg v. Graham, 57 F. Supp. 938, 941-42 (ED. Ark. 1944), appeal
dismissed per stipulation, 149 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1945); United States ex rel. Altieri v.
Flint, 54 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1943), aff'd, 142 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1944).
30 See generally W. AYcocK & S. WURFEL, MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE
314-29 (1955).
1n re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890); In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157 (1890); Stingle's
Case, 23 F. Cas. 107 (No. 13,458) (E.D. Pa. 1863); United States ex rel. Turner v.
Wright, 28 F. Cas. 798 (No. 16,778) (W.D. Pa. 1862).

OF MILITARY JUsTIcE
31

32Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542 (1944). See United States ex rel. Roberson v.
Keating, 121 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. IMI.1949).
33 E.g., Striker v. Resor, 283 F. Supp. 923 (D.N.J. 1968). But see Pickens v. Cox,
282 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1960).
34 United States ex rel. Wilkerson v. Commanding Officer, 286 F. Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); United States ex rel. Caputo v. Sharp, 282 F. Supp. 362 (ED. Pa. 1968).
35 Powers v. Powers, 400 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1968).
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The limitation of military habeas corpus review to questions of jurisdiction was expanded only slightly at the turn of the nineteenth
century to permit inquiry into whether the court-martial had exceeded
its power in imposing sentence,3 6 and whether the court-martial was
legally constituted 37 As late as 1950, the Supreme Court could still
state in Hiatt v. Brown that "[i]t is well settled that 'by habeas
corpus the civil courts exercise no supervisory or correcting power
over the proceedings of a court-martial ....The single inquiry, the test,
is jurisdiction.' "3'However, Hiatt proved to be a last declaration of
orthodoxy, for during the 1930's and 1940's there had been a steady
expansion in the scope of federal habeas corpus review of state court
decisions, 39 and by the early 1950's similar pressures were generated regarding military habeas corpus. In 1953, in Burns v. Wilson,40
the Court accepted the contention that federal courts, on considering
petitions for writs of habeas corpus, may review claims of denial of due
process which the military had manifestly refused to consider in courtsmartial. Since Burns v. Wilson, the scope of military habeas corpus has
included inquiry into whether the court-martial had proper jurisdiction
of the person and the offense, whether the accused was accorded due
process of law pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and
whether the military tribunal gave fair and full consideration to all procedural safeguards necessary to a fair trial under military law.4 '
36 Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902).
37 McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49 (1902).
38 339 U.S. 103, 111 (1950).
39 See Note, The Freedom Writ-The Expanding Use of Federal Habeas Corpus, 61
HARV. L. Rxv. 657, 660 (1948). See generally H. M. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note

26, at 1238.
40 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
41 This interpretation of the scope of habeas corpus review after Burns was stated by
the Tenth Circuit in Gorko v. Commanding Officer, 314 F.2d 858, 859 (10th Cir. 1963),
and has been followed in a number of subsequent Tenth Circuit cases. E.g., Kennedy
v. Commandant, 377 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1967); Palomera v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 937 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 946 (1965). However, there have been a number of different interpretations of the scope of review after Burns. See Katz & Nelson, The Need
for Clarification in Military Habeas Corpus, 27 Omo ST. L.J. 193 (1966). The inquiry
into whether the accused was accorded due process of law has generally been interpreted
as including only those rights incident to military due process. United States v. Clay,
1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951), viewed the term "military due process" as referring only to those rights, derived from Congress rather than the Bill of Rights,
which are requisite to fundamental fairness in a court-martial, apparently as defined
in the Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter referred to as UCMJ] Art. 64, 10
U.S.C. § 864 (1964). However, United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29
C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (1960), stated that "the protections of the Bill of Rights, except those

490
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Review of AdministrativeDeterminations
The second type of military determination affecting personnel-the
non-judicial administrative decision-has undergone a slightly different historical development with respect to the doctrine of nonreviewability. Throughout the nineteenth century, military administrative determinations were considered "executive" actions and hence im-3
mune from court review. 42 This rule, despite its questionable rationale,'
prevailed until the development of modem concepts of administrative
law in the twentieth century. In 1902 the Supreme Court in American
School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty" decided that courts have
jurisdiction to review the acts of an administrative department (the
Post Office) and thus abolished the "executive" immunity of military
administrative determinations. Subsequently, the justification cited for
nonreview of military administrative determinations was based upon
the concept that because of the traditional and constitutional separation
of military and civil authority, civilian courts have no power to interfere with the military sphere.4 5
The doctrine of nonreviewability of military administrative determinations was largely developed in suits seeking review of discharges.
Discharge cases are a paradigm for the doctrine of nonreviewability 0
which are expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are available to members of
our armed forces." In re Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965), is an example of a
liberal interpretation of Burns, and holds that the district court could determine on
habeas corpus a claim of denial of the sixth amendment right to counsel in a special
court-martial, although such right had not previously been held to be necessary for
military due process, United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963).
But see Kennedy v. Commandant, supra; LeBallister v. Warden, 247 F. Supp. 349 (D.
Kan. 1965).
42
See Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840), in which the Supreme Court
held that it had no jurisdiction to review an administrative determination of the Secretary of the Navy as to the applicability of a federal pension statute to a member
of the military, because the action of the Secretary, like any other executive department, was immune from review.
43 The rule is criticized in 3 K. DAvIs, AD nIiNISRATrV LAW TRAnsE § 23.11-.12
(1958); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL O1 ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 181 (1965), and indeed
is no longer followed. See Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167 (1936) (granting
review of administrative decision rejecting claim for annuity on question of law).
44187 U.S. 94 (1902).
45 This position was taken largely in reliance on the decision in Dynes v. Hoover,
61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858), see text at note 23 supra, and subsequent court-martial
cases.

46 "It was almost exclusively against the background of these numerous disputes over
the fact or type of discharge that the Willoughby rule developed during the first half
of the twentieth century." Comment, God, the Army, and judicial Review: The
in-Sermce Conscientious Objector, supra note 2, at 419. See text at note 63 infra.
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for they involve a particularly vital concern of the military-its ability
to meet manpower requirements-which is frequently cited as a justification for giving the military a free hand over its personnel. Since
the military must rely on recruitment and the draft for its manpower,
it is of some importance that it possess the power to require, grant, or
withhold discharges and to condition them as honorable or less than
honorable. The first discharge case to reach the Supreme Court after
MeAnnulty was Reaves v. Ainswortb4 in which an officer sought
review of an examination board proceeding that had retired him involuntarily. The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review due
process claims in discharge proceedings, emphasizing the military's autonomous nature rather than its executive immunity. Subsequent decisions49 after World War I relied upon the DynesO view of the
military's historical immunity from civilian review in holding that
discharge actions were not reviewable.
Although the nonreviewability of discharge determinations has often
been stated in absolute terms, 51 significant modifications have been effected in this area. The first breaches in the nonreviewability doctrine
occurred in cases seeking correction of a discharge after the fact, probably because such suits offer less threat of interference with military
operations. In Pattersonv. Lamb,5 2 the petitioner brought suit twentynine years after receiving a World War I "discharge from the draft"
(which disqualified him from veterans' benefits) to compel the Army to
issue him a certificate of honorable discharge. The Supreme Court refused the relief, but only after accepting jurisdiction and reviewing the
case on the merits. In Harmon v. Brucker,53 decided in 1958, the Court
made a more distinct break with the nonreviewability doctrine. Harmon
had been given an undesirable discharge as a security risk because of his
allegedly subversive activities prior to induction, despite an excellent
47See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 391 U.S. 910 (application for stay denied mem.)
(Harlan, J.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 896 (1968); Brown v. McNamara, 263 F. Supp. 686
(D.N.J.), aff'd, 387 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1005 (1968).
48219 U.S. 296 (1911).
49 United States ex rel. French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326 (1922); United States ex rel.
Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336 (1922).
50 See text at note 23 supra.
51 See, e.g., Gentila v. Pace, 193 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 943
(1952); Davis v. Woodring, 111 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Marshall v. Wyman, 132
F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Nordmann v. Woodring, 28 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Okla.
1939).
52 329 U.S. 539 (1947).

53 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (per curiam).
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service record. He brought suit to require the Secretary of the Army
to void the undesirable discharge and issue an honorable discharge.
The Court relied upon MoAnnulty and, by analogy, upon Burns v.
Wilson,"4 in holding that federal courts have jurisdiction to consider
claims that the Secretary has exceeded his statutory authority by
basing the undesirable discharge on pre-induction conduct. A recent
D.C. Circuit opinion, Kennedy v. Secretary of the Navy,5 5 has further
extended Harmon by permitting a suit to void a dishonorable discharge
that was issued because the petitioner was a member of the Communist Party while he was in the service.
Further inroads on the nonreviewability doctrine have been made
in remedial discharge cases involving claims that a discharge was based
56
on a constitutionally defective court-martial. In Ashe v. McNamara,
the First Circuit ruled that the Secretary of Defense had a duty to
change a seventeen-year-old dishonorable discharge to honorable because it was adjudged in a court-martial which violated petitioner's
constitutional rights.57 Two related Court of Claims decisions58 voided
the dismissals of two officers because the Secretary failed to provide
regulation-required hearings after the officers' court-martial convictions
(upon which the dismissals were based) were set aside. In a slightly
different context, but also involving correction of military records
after the fact, a federal district court in Robson v. United States5 9
recently vacated a previously effected court-martial conviction because
54 See text at note 40 supra.
55 401 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cit.
1961); Davis v. Stahr, 293 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cit. 1961).
56 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cit. 1965).
57 In Davies v. Clifford, 393 F.2d 496 (1st Cit. 1968), aff'g 275 F. Supp. 278 (D.N.H.
1967), petitioner sued in federal court after an unsuccessful petition to the Court of
Military Apeals to have a 16-year-old court-martial conviction vacated because of errors which, it was admitted, violated his constitutional rights. The First Circuit ruled
that it had no jurisdiction to make a direct review of a court-martial conviction and
distinguished its previous decision in Ashe as a case involving only "collateral administrative relief" in voiding a punitive discharge, while in Davies the petitioner
sought direct review of a decision of the Court of Military Appeals. The court
specifically rejected the language in Augenblick v. United States, 377 F.2d 586, 591-93
(Ct. Cl. 1967), rev'd, 89 S. Ct. 528 (1969), and Gallagher v. Quinn, 363 F.2d 301 (D.C.
Ci.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881 (1966), which implied jurisdiction to review action of
the Court of Military Appeals other than by writ of habeas corpus.
58 Hamlin v. United States, 391 F.2d 941 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Motto v. United States, 348
F.2d 523 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
59279 F. Supp. 631 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
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subsequent facts indicated that it had been obtained with illegally seized
evidence.
Cases seeking court action affecting the discharge of one still in the
military involve greater interference with day-to-day military operations, but here too there have been inroads on the nonreviewability
doctrine. In Reed v. Franke0° a serviceman with 18 years of service
sued to enjoin the Navy from administratively discharging him as an
alcoholic because of two courts-martial concerning his driving while
under the influence of intoxicants (He had the misfortune of colliding
with a Vice Admiral's automobile.). The court stated that while there
can be no direct judicial review of the administrative proceedings, the
procedure involved will be subject to review where there is a substantial claim that prescribed military procedures violate constitutional
rights."1 Despite this statement, however, the court found that because
the petitioner had not exhausted available military remedies, his claim
could not be heard. Further extending the scope of available civilian
relief, Schwartz v. Covington 2 held that a pending undesirable discharge based on alleged homosexual activities could be enjoined until
the enlisted man involved sought relief from various review boards
within the service.
Although genuine inroads have thus been made in the nonreviewability doctrine with respect to discharge cases, the doctrine is still
closely followed with regard to military determinations concerning
orders, duty assignments, personnel status, and other non-discharge
administrative determinations. The principal authority for an absolute
rule of nonreviewability in such cases is the Supreme Court's 1953
decision in Orloff v. WilloughbyY Orloff, a doctor who had been
drafted, brought a habeas corpus suit to require the Army to assign
him to medical duties and award him a commission which had been
denied because of his refusal to answer certain questions concerning
prior Communist Party affiliations. Despite a limited fact situation
(The Army had voluntarily assigned him to medical duties before the
case reached the Supreme Court, thus weakening his claim that the
malassignment caused a substantial loss of rights.), the Court expressed
its decision in absolute terms. It found that although the Doctors' Draft
60 297 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1961).
61

Id. at 19-21.

62 341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965).
63

345 U.S. 83 (1953).
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Act entitled Orloff to a medical assignment, the Court had no power
to review the Army determination preventing such an assignment:
[I]t is not within the power of this Court by habeas corpus to determine whether specific assignments to duty fall within the basic
classification of petitioner.... While the courts have found occasion
to determine whether one has been lawfully inducted and is therefore
within the jurisdiction of the Army and subject to its orders, we have
found no case where this Court has assumed to revise duty orders as
to one lawfully in the service.6
The Court went on to express the policy behind the doctrine of nonreviewability in language which has been repeated in nearly every
subsequent military review case:
[J]udges are not given the task of running the Arm..... The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that
the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army
matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial
matters. 65

Although the broad proscription in Orloff has not been followed
in the discharge cases discussed above, and although further doubt has
now been raised as to the doctrine's applicability in attacking military
personnel determinations on certain limited grounds,6 the strict rule of
nonreviewability has been applied in suits involving military orders for
7
a particular assignment or a particular location (even if overseas),
64 Id. at 93-94.
651d.
66

E.g., cases attacking determinations as exceeding the statutory authority of the

military, Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969); Thompson v. Clifford, 37

U.S.L.W. 2349 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 13, 1968); United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy, 259 F.2d 927, 929 (D.C. Cit. 1958), aff'd, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Noyd v.
Bond, 285 F. Supp. 785 (D.N.M.), rev'd, 402 F.2d 441 (10th Cir.), non-incarcerated
status granted, 89 S. Ct. 478 (1968), cert. granted, 89 S. Ct. 692 (1969); Winters v.
United States, 281 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curianz, 390 F.2d 879 (2d Cir.),
stay denied, 391 U.S. 910, cert denied, 393 U.S. 896 (1968); Fox v. Brown, 402 F.2d
837 (2d Cir.), aff'g 286 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (dicta); Robson v. United States,
279 F. Supp. 631 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (dicta), or as violating first amendment rights, Smith
v. Ritchey, 89 S. Ct. 54 (1968); Howe v. Clifford, No. 622-68 (D.D.C. 1968).
67 Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967); Brown v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 150 (3d
Cit. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1005 (1968), aff'g 263 F. Supp. 686 (D.N.J. 1967);
Noyd v. McNamara, 378 F.2d 538 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022, aff'g 267
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discretionary administrative determinations such as whether an individual is physically fit for overseas duty 8 or whether a unit has
received adequate training for assignment to a war zone,69 and referral of charges to court-martial. 70 These decisions, generally involving
the assignments and status of servicemen, are unlike the discharge cases
in that they employ a mechanical application of the nonreviewability
doctrine rather than a balancing of such relevant considerations as
the nature of the petitioner's challenge to the military determination,
the degree of anticipated interference with the military, the extent to
which military expertise is actually involved, and the potential injury
to the petitioner if review is refused.
The large number of suits during the Vietnam War period seeking
relief from military determinations have put the federal courts in the
difficult position of having to make decisions on highly sensitive
political issues. The Supreme Court has rather consistently refused to
grant certiorari in cases involving controversial questions relating to
the conduct of the war and the operation of the military, 71 but the
lower courts cannot avoid the issues as easily. Some courts have simply
applied the strict doctrine of nonreviewability to military cases, summarily denying jurisdiction. 72 However, the erosion of the nonreviewability doctrine has made such absolute denials of jurisdiction difficult
F. Supp. 701 (D. Colo. 1967); Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 945 (1967); Cooper v. United States, 403 F.2d 71 (10th Cir. 1968) (dicta);
United States v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 972 (1967)
(dicta).
68Weber v. Clifford, 289 F. Supp. 960 (D. Md. 1968).
69 McAbee v. Martinez, 291 F. Supp. 77 (D. Md.), injunctive relief denied, 393 U.S.
904
(1968).
70
In re Kelly, 401 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1968); Levy v. McNamara, Civil No. 953-67
(D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Levy v. Corcoran, 389 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, J., dissenting), stay denied, 387 U.S. 915, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 960 (1967); Gorko v. Commanding Officer, 314 F.2d 858 (10th Cit. 1963); cf. Stolte v. United States, Misc. No.
68-4 (U.S.M.C.A. 1968) (unsuccessful attempt to enjoin court-martial in Court of
Military Appeals). But see Crane v. Hedrick, 284 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
71 See, e.g., Brown v. McNamara, 390 U.S. 1005 (1968), and Noyd v. McNamara, 389
U.S. 1022 (1967) (attacks on denials of conscientious objector discharges and the
statutory scheme); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1966), Luftig v. McNamara, 387
U.S. 945 (1967), and Mitchell v. United States, 386 U.S. 972 (1967) (attacking legality
of the war in Vietnam); Morse v. Boswell, 89 S. Ct. 687 (1969), McArthur v. Clifford, 393 U.S. 1002 (1968), and Winters v. United States, 393 U.S. 896 (1968) (attacking
activation of reserve units and individual reservists).
72 See, e.g., Chavez v. Fergusson, 266 F. Supp. 879 (N.D. Cal. 1967), appeal disMissed,
395 F.2d 215 (9th Cit. 1968) (appeal moot where petitioner had already served sentence
and been discharged).
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to justify in certain cases, particularly those claiming denials of constitutional rights in courts-martial, discharges, and other administrative
decisions, or indicating clear abuses of statutory authority. Other courts
have rejected the strict nonreviewability doctrine but, after reviewing
a case on the merits and sometimes raising a number of considerations
relating to the appropriateness of court interference, have refused
the requested relief.73 Still another approach has been to deny jurisdiction, not on the grounds of nonreviewability, but on the grounds that
the petitioner had not exhausted available military remedies and therefore the case was not yet ripe for review by a federal court. 74 This use,
or perhaps abuse, of the concept of exhaustion of remedies and its relationship to the nonreviewability doctrine will be examined in the
following sections.
THE ExHAusTIoN OF REMEDIES DOCTRINE AND JURISDICTION
TO REVIEW MILITARY DETERMINATIONS

The rule that a party must exhaust the remedies available to him
within the military before he can seek federal court review of a
military determination has its roots both in common law and administrative law. The exhaustion concept developed as a practical
requirement of finality to be met before an appellate court could
review the determinations of a lower court.75 The concept also played
a role in the allocation of jurisdiction between law and equity by requiring the exhaustion of legal remedies before equity would take
jurisdiction.7" In administrative law the concept took on importance in
relation to court review of administrative determinations; in refusing
review of such determinations, courts have been especially concerned
with preserving the autonomy of administrative agencies.77 This con73 Stanford v. United States, 399 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1968) (denial of application
to have record reflect disabilities suffered in military held not arbitrary or capricious
or unsupported by substantial evidence); Schultz v. Clifford, 1 SSLR 3256 (D. Minn.
Oct. 22, 1968)

(activation of individual held proper); In re Kanewske, 260 F. Supp.

521 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (adequate evidence in record to support denial of conscientious
objector discharge), appeal dismissed sub nom. Kanewske v. Nitze, 383 F.2d 388 (9th
Cir. 1967) (habeas corpus not available after sentence served and petitioner discharged).
74

Brown v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1005
(1968), aff'g 263 F. Supp. 686 (D.N.J. 1967); Noyd v. McNamara, 378 F.2d 538 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022, aff'g 267 F. Supp. 701 (D. Colo. 1967).
75
See Jaffe, supranote 28, at 327-29.
76
See generally 2 J. MooaE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2.03 (2d ed. 1967).
77
Under the Anglo-American conception, administrative agencies are distinct
entities; they are not a part of the judicial system. Judicial control comes in from
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cern is particularly relevant to the military which has a long tradition
of independence as to its courts and administrative decisions.
The rationale behind the exhaustion of remedies doctrine includes
both practical considerations of efficiency and orderly procedure, and
a concern for retaining separation of powers between the judiciary
and the other branches of the government. In relation to court review
of military determinations, the exhaustion doctrine embodies many of
the same objectives as the precept of nonreviewability. By postponing
civil court review of a military determination until the military has
had an opportunity to apply its expertise, exhaustion, like nonreviewability, prevents unnecessary civilian interference in military matters
and ensures military autonomy over its own business.
Although there are similar justifications for the use of nonreviewability and exhaustion of remedies, there is a distinct and important
difference between the two concepts. The nonreviewability doctrine
is a complete bar to a court's jurisdiction. If the principles of the
concept apply to a given case, the court has no power to review
the proceedings of a military tribunal, even in determining the scope of
nonreviewability in the particular case.7 s Exhaustion of remedies, however, is a discretionary doctrine applied by courts to ensure that review is not premature. Although it also masks important interests in
preserving separation of powers, this interest is served by the court's
voluntarily abstention until an appropriate time, rather than by barring
jurisdiction. Thus, to the extent that some recent cases intermingle the
exhaustion doctrine with language from cases turning on nonreviewability,79 they would appear to be misapplying the exhaustion rule.
The exhaustion of remedies doctrine, as it has developed in administhe outside. The agency is either within the Executive or, under Humphrey's
Executor, "independent." The Judiciary will not lightly interfere with a job
given to the Executive until it is clear that the Executive has exceeded its mandate. The exhaustion doctrine is, therefore, an expression of executive and administrative autonomy. And it has peculiar pertinence when, as is so often the
case, the agency has been given large discretionary powers and the potential
exercise of these powers is relevant to the solution of the issues for which early
review is sought.
Jaffe, supra note 28, at 328.
78 However, several recent decisions suggest that review may be necessary in order
to make an adequate determination as to the question of reviewabiity. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1968),
reconsiderationof denial of stay denied, 89 S. Ct. 609 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Fox v. Brown, 402 F.2d 837 (2d Cir.), aff'g 286 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Robson
v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 631 (ED. Pa. 1968).
79 For a discussion of this phenomenon, see text at notes 141-157 infra.
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trative law, has a number of limitations. First, one need only exhaust
remedies which provide a genuine opportunity for relief.80 Second,
exhaustion is not required where the petitioner may suffer irreparable
injury if compelled to pursue his administrative remedies. 81 Third,
exhaustion is not required, under some precedents,2 if the plaintiff has
raised a substantial constitutional question.8s This is especially true
when the administrative tribunal lacks the expertise or authority to
resolve adequately the constitutional question. Thus, in Wills v. United
States,8 4 the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff attacking his punitive reclassification as a violation of first amendment rights was not required
to exhaust his selective service remedies:
In the first place, appellant's objection to his classification was not addressed to the area of administrative judgment. It did not pose a question upon which courts, bowing to special expertise, would regard
the administrative determination as final, save only where basis in fact
is lacking. His objection, founded upon a claim of constitutional
right, was one on which courts have little reason to defer to administrative determination. The exhaustion rule loses much of its force
in this area. 8
These limitations on the exhaustion doctrine are, of course, only
working guides which courts have devised for dealing with administrative agencies. The degree to which the military can be analogized to
an administrative agency or a state court system in its relation to the
federal courts has been subjected to little judicial scrutiny. While
certain historical and constitutional differences between the military
and these other semi-autonomous systems indicate that wholesale application of administrative law exhaustion principles to the military may
be inappropriate, there are distinct similarities between the systems,
and as the traditional concept of absolute military immunity from civil
court interference continues to wane, the principles of exhaustion must
80 See Jaffee, supra note 28, at 329.
81 Eccles v. People's Bank, 333 U.S. 426, 434 (1948); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v.
Russell, 261 U.S. 290 (1923); Colonial House, Inc. v. Connecticut St. Bd. of Lab. Rel.,
23 Conn. Supp. 30, 176 A.2d 381 (Super. Ct. 1961).
82 Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939); Isbrandtsen v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1954); see Jaffee, supra note 28, at 331-34.
88
See 3 K. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW TREATisE § 20.04 (1958).
84 384 F.2d 943 (9th Cir. 1967).
85 Id. at 945.
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have considerable weight in determining the timeliness of civilian court
review of military determinations.
There is a basic similarity between state and military courts in their
relationship to the federal courts: Untimely federal court interference is
a threat to the autonomy of both. Exhaustion of remedies was introduced into state-federal relations when Congress extended habeas corpus
jurisdiction over state prisoners to the federal courts in 1867,6 and in
Ex parte Royall5 7 it was interpreted as an aspect of comity required
to maintain the proper state-federal balance. s Since the scope of habeas
corpus review of military determinations orginally extended only to the
question of whether the military tribunal had proper jurisdiction,6 there
was little need at that time for a rule of military exhaustion to deal
with premature review. While a few early decisions seemed to rely
upon considerations peculiar to the exhaustion doctrine,9 0 explicit reliance upon the concept was not often utilized until after World War II
when the expanded scope of habeas corpus review of military determinations raised the spectre of federal courts being inundated by the
habeas corpus applications of military personnel.9 1
In 1949, Article of War 53,92 (now Article 73 of the Uniform Code
86 Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
87 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
s8 Regarding the scope of habeas corpus review of state courts, see generally C.
WpaRGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 177-86 (1963). With respect to federal courts see W.
AYcocx & S. W RFEL, supra note 30, at 314-78.
89 See text at note 30 supra.
90 E.g., Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885), in which the Supreme Court held

that it had no habeas corpus jurisdiction to determine the validity of military orders
and that the petitioners could raise the question of their legality in the military courts.
91
See W. AycocK & S. WURFEL, supra note 30, at 314, 350-54.
92
Article 53 conferred discretionary authority upon the Judge Advocate General to
grant a new trial, vacate a sentence, or modify a discharge if application for such

relief was made within one year after final determination of the case upon initial military

appellate review. The Article ended with the following proviso:
Provided . . . That all action by the Judge Advocate General pursuant to this
article ... shall be final and conclusive . .. and all action taken pursuant to such

proceedings, shall be binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and officers
of the United States.
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNrrED STATES Ai~y 291 (1949), 13 Fed. Reg. 7519,
7550 (1949). Whelchel v. McDonald, 178 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd, 340 U.S. 122

(1950), stated that "the last words of the amended Article of Var 53, seem to make
the action of the Judge Advocate General refusing a new trial binding upon the courts
of the United States." However, Schilder v. Gusik, 180 F.2d 662 (6th Cir. 1950), rev'd

on other grounds, 340 U.S. 128 (1950), read the same words (which are now part of
Art. 76, UCMJ) as giving the Judge Advocate General's determination, under Art. 53,
finality upon the merits only and not as precluding habeas corpus attack. United
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of Military Justice9 3) was passed by Congress to permit, under certain
conditions, a petition for new trial within one year after approval of a
court-martial sentence by the convening authority. In 1951, a new
Manual for Courts-Martialwas published and included the following
provision:
Prior to the exhaustion of the remedies of appellate review and petition
for new trial which are available to an accused person, . ..

a resort

to habeas corpus to test the legality of restraint imposed pursuant to a
sentence of a court-martial is inappropriate and premature.94
Commentators have observed that these changes were intended to
establish adequate post-conviction procedures within the military which
must be exhausted as a prerequisite to federal habeas corpus review 3
One year later, a case concerning the scope and application of
Article 53 in relation to the exhaustion of remedies requirement reached
the Supreme Court. In Gusik v. Schilder,9 6 a petitioner convicted of
murder by a court-martial petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on
the ground that the court-martial lacked jurisdiction due to denial of
statutory and constitutional rights to a pre-trial investigation and effecStates v. Augenblick, 89 S. Ct. 528, 530 (1969) (dicta), states that habeas corpus relief
is an "implied exception" to Art. 76, UCMJ.
93 Article 73 reads:
Petition for a new trial. At any time within one year after approval by the
convening authority of a court-martial sentence which extends to death, dismissal, dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for one year or
more, the accused may petition the Judge Advocate General for a new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence or fraud on the court.
MANUAL FOR CoUars-MARTIAL, UIaED STATES (1951). Article 73 was amended in 1968 to
extend the time for appeal from one to two years and to permit the accused to
petition for a new trial in all cases where there is newly discovered evidence or fraud
on the court. The Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, § 873 art. 73 (Oct.
24, 1968), 1 U.S. CODE CoNG. &. AD. NEws 1570-71 (1968).
94 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES
214b. at 389 (1951). The chapter
concerning exhaustion and habeas corpus within the military has been deleted from the

1969 edition of the

MANUAL.

95 It is important to remember the extraordinary nature of habeas corpus, the basic
doctrine of the necessity of full exhaustion of all other remedies first, the vast
administrative burden that abusive resort to the writ has cast upon the courts
and the desire of both the courts and Congress to establish post-conviction hearing procedures which are both more adequate and more conclusive than the
traditional writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum . . . . Article of War 53, and
its Uniform Code successor, Article 73, constitute the congressional solution to
the problem in military cases just as section 2255 is its solution to the problem in
civil cases.
W. AYcocK & S. WURFEL, supra note 30, at 344.
96 340 U.S. 128 (1950).
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tive assistance of counsel. Analogizing the situation to state-federal
habeas corpus practice, the Court stated that the reason for requiring
exhaustion is that interference by the federal court may be a needless
cause of friction if the military does offer a remedy, 7 and ruled that
the district court should refuse to hear the case pending petitioner's
exhaustion of his remedy under Article 53.
The exhaustion of remedies doctrine was codified at approximately
the same time in the state-federal 8 and the military-federal contexts.
Since that time, however, the exhaustion requirement as applied to
federal court review of state decisions has been significantly liberalized.
In Fay v. Noia, 9 the Supreme Court materially reduced the exhaustion
requirement by holding that a state prisoner who failed to appeal his
conviction in time can nevertheless obtain federal habeas corpus review
because the section 2254 exhaustion requirement' 00 only applies to state
remedies available at the time of application for habeas corpus.' 01 No
analogous development has taken place regarding federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction over court-martial convictions. This can be explained in
part, perhaps, by the fact that the Court of Military Appeals has taken
an active role in upholding and extending due process rights in courtsmartial,:"" thus lessening the need to liberalize the exhaustion rule. That
liberalization of court review which has occurred has tended to concern
the fact and scope of review, rather than the exhaustion element of timing.
The development of the exhaustion doctrine regarding court review
at 132.
9828 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62
Star. 967).
99372 U.S. 391 (1963).
100 See note 98 supra.
101 See also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), providing guidelines as to when
a hearing must be granted by federal courts on habeas corpus applications.
102The Court of Military Appeals has extended to servicemen such due process
rights as the right to a speedy trial, United States v. Schlack, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 371, 34
C.M.R. 151 (1964); right to confront witnesses, United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A.
428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960); right of protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures, United States v. Vierra, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 33 C.M.R. 260 (1963); United States
v. Nowling, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 100, 25 C.M.R. 362 (1958); privilege against self-incrimination,
United States v. Kemp, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 89, 32 C.M.R. 89 (1962); right to a public trial,
United States v. Brown, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 251, 22 C.M.R. 41 (1956); right to compulsory
process, United States v. Sweeney, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 599, 34 C.M.R. 379 (1964); and the
right to pre-interogation warnings, United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R.
249 (1967). See generally Quinn, The United States Court of Military Appeals and
Military Due Process,35 St.JOHN's L. REv. 225 (1961).
97 1d.
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of military administrative determinations has paralleled that concerning
court-martial decisions. Where military regulations have made various
channels of appeal or remedies available, courts have uniformly required
that these channels be exhausted before seeking court review. The
question often arises, however, as to whether a particular forum or
channel is indeed necessary to achieve finality and whether it actually
provides a genuine source of relief. For example, the discharge cases
have created a dispute over whether one must exhaust all the military
administrative boards created for post-discharge review before seeking
court review. 1 3 Clearly, seeking court review before discharge is final
would be a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Thus, in Bernstein v. Herren,'° two soldiers were refused declaratory judgment
relief from a threatened administrative discharge because the discharge
proceedings had not yet gone beyond a Field Board of Inquiry, and
therefore the injury might, never materialize.' 5
More difficult problems arise when an individual has already been
discharged from the service, and there is a split among the circuit courts
as to whether boards for correction of records and discharge review
must always be petitioned unsuccessfully before resort can be made
to the federal courts. The Fifth Circuit in McCurdy v. Zuckert'06
has held that the district courts lack jurisdiction in the absence of
exhaustion of post-discharge review boards because such boards offer
"complete retroactive restoration." However, the D.C. Circuit in Ogden
103 Discharge review boards are established by each service pursuant to 10 U.S.C.
§ 1553 (1964). They are composed of military officers, follow a relatively informal
procedure and will grant a hearing automatically upon request for review of any
discharge or dismissal to determine whether an error or injustice has been made. Boards
for the correction of records are established by each service under 10 U.S.C. § 1552
(1964). They are composed of civilians serving part time and do not grant hearings
to an applicant as a matter of right. Subject to approval by the Secretary of the
military department involved, they can grant change of type of discharge, elimination
of discharge and restoration to duty, restoration to rank, or elimination of derogatory
information from applicant's military records. See Joint Hearings on S. 745-62, S. 2906-7,
Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 828-33 (1966); Everett, Military Administrative Discharges
-The Pendulum Sivings, 1966 DuKE L.J. 41; Meador, JudicialDeterminationsof Military
Status, 72 YALE L.J. 1293 (1963).

104 141 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
105 Similarly, in Michaelson v. Herren, 242 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1957), a sergeant was
denied injunctive relief to prevent an administrative discharge because he had neither
been discharged nor petitioned the discharge review boards.
106 359 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied sub nora. McCurdy v. Brown, 385 U.S.
903; accord, Tuggle v. Brown, 362 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam).
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v. Zuckert'07 permitted an Air Force officer to obtain court review of
his medical disability discharge even though he had not petitioned the
Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records. The court found
that the statute which established the Board 08 was not intended to
affect judicial jurisdiction, but to relieve Congress of having to pass
private legislation aimed at remedying individual discharges. The extent
of the court's actual reliance on this legislative intent is unclear, for
the court went on to emphasize that a determination from the Board
may take up to three years and that even if the Board finds in
petitioner's favor, the power to correct the discharge is not in the
Board but in the Secretary of the Air Force who is only bound to make
corrections "when he considers it necessary." 109 These factors demonstrate the court's concern with the adequacy of the available relief
rather than the legislative intent. Furthermore, the court stressed the
fact that the principle of exhaustion is discretionary" 0 and tempered
its decision by stating that on remand the district court could, in its
discretion, reject jurisdiction pending application for relief from the
military board. Thus, although Ogden raised serious questions as to
whether correction of records boards are intended as a step in the
finality of a discharge determination and whether they provide an
adequate remedy, it left the weighing of such considerations to the
lower court's discretion. Subsequent circuit court opinions have followed this discretionary approach."'
The considerations to be weighed by the court in applying its discretion with regard to exhaustion include the adequacy of the military
remedy, the threat of irreparable injury, and the existence of substantial constitutional questions. Indeed, it is the treatment of these
considerations which distinguishes between a strict and a liberal application of the exhaustion doctrine. One of the few Supreme Court cases
concerning the doctrine in military discharge cases provides a somewhat
stringent application. In Beard v. Stabr,"2 an Army lieutenant colonel
sought to enjoin the Secretary of the Army from giving him a general
107 298 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
108 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a) (1964).
109 298 F.2d at 316-17.
110 Id. at 317.
"' Nelson v. Mier, 373 F.2d 474 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 924 (1967); Sohm

v. Fowler, 365 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Sohm held that when post-discharge remedies
have not been exhausted, the district court should retain jurisdiction but defer decision
unless there are "special circumstances."
112 370 U.S. 41 (1962)

(per curiam).
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discharge for conduct unbecoming an officer. The suit was brought
after the Army Board of Review recommended discharge but before
the Secretary had made his decision, and alleged that the Board's
proceedings denied the officer due process of the law. The Supreme
Court, in a per curiam opinion with five justices joining, directed that
the suit be dismissed for prematurity since the Secretary had not yet
exercised his discretionary authority and because the appellant had
adequate procedures for seeking redress if he were removed from the
active list.1 3
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, dissented on the grounds
that the hearing had denied petitioner due process by putting the
burden of proving fitness on him and denying confrontation with his
accuser. The dissent maintained that the suit was ripe for adjudication
because even if the Secretary's decision were favorable, and even if
petitioner could recover loss of salary and pension in a subsequent collateral action, the proceeding involved the considerable issues of a
man's professional standing, character, and claim to an honorable discharge." 4 Justice Douglas focused obliquely on the irreparable injury
and constitutional question aspects of the exhaustion principle by
arguing that a petitioner should not have to wait to attack an obviously
unconsitutional administrative proceeding until the Secretary had determined to remove him from the active list. Such continued delay,
the argument suggests, causes irreparable injury to reputation which
cannot be repaired even by a final favorable determination. Thus
Beard, unlike Ogden which concentrated on the adequacy of remedy,
was primarily concerned with whether the exhaustion requirement
should be waived in light of threatened irreparable injury. The fact
that the majority supported exhaustion despite fairly persuasive evidence
of at least intangible injury indicates a particular interest in requiring
"finality" in military discharge determinations which may not easily be
overridden by claims of irreparable injury.
Thus, prior to the Vietnam War period, the exhaustion of remedies
doctrine applicable to military determinations had still not been thoroughly investigated and explained in the courts. The few relevant
decisions were more expressions of judicial attitudes than clear, analytical statements of principles and guidelines to be employed in applying the doctrine. With the advent of the Vietnam War, however,
the judiciary was given a greater opportunity to dissect the exhaustion
13 d. at 42.
114 1d. at 44.
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principle, due largely to the magnification of problems attending the

administration of conscientious objector discharges.
APPLICATION OF THE EXHAUSTION DocrRui
TO
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR DISCHARGE CASES DURING THE
VIETNAM WAR

Throughout the last fifty years, discharge cases have accounted for
the majority of suits seeking court review of military determinations.
The bases for such suits have often reflected problems and conflicts peculiar to the times in which they were brought. For example, discharge
suits between the two world wars were largely brought by career
officers seeking to prevent their separation under manpower reduction
programs; 115 suits during World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam
War, and other periods of increased conscription predominantly sought
to force the military to grant a discharge; 1 6 and many of the suits
brought between the Korean and Vietnam Wars sought to upgrade a
less than honorable discharge awarded because of allegedly subversive,
homosexual, or other unacceptable conduct. 1 7 A distinctive genus of
suit during the Vietnam War has been that concerned with the
conscientious objector discharge. The suit was only made possible by a
1962 change in military regulations which provided for discharge of
conscientious objectors whose views developed or crystallized after
induction." s While the United States had always provided for some
form of exemption from the draft for conscientious objectors," 9 this
115See, e.g., United States ex rel. French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326 (1922); United
States ex reL Creary v. Wees, 259 U.S. 336 (1922).
116See, e.g., Nelson v. Peckham, 210 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1954), and cases cited notes
6, 7, 8, 32 supra.
117 See, e.g., cases cited notes 53, 55, 60, 62 supra.
18 Department of Defense (DOD) Directive No. 1200.6 (Aug. 21, 1962) was issued
by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to his power over the Department of Defense
in 10 U.S.C. § 133 (1964). Its purpose was stated as providing "uniform procedures for
the utilization of conscientious objectors in the Armed Forces and consideration of
requests for discharge on the grounds of conscientious objection." It has been replaced
by DOD Directive No. 1300.6 (May 10, 1968) which made two changes: First, claims
"based on conscientious objection growing out of experiences prior to entering military
service, but which did not become fixed until entry into the service, will [now] be
considered," id. at 3, while previously objection had to develop before entry; second,
there is now an opportunity to appear "before an officer in the grade of 0-3 or
higher, who is knowledgeable in policies and procedures relating to conscientious objector matters" who "will enter his recommendation and the reasons therefor into the
file." Id. at 7.
119 See Mansfield, Conscientious Objection-1964 Term, in 3 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIc
ORDER 1 (1965).
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was the first time that provision was made for discharge of in-service
conscientious objectors. Since the new administrative scheme was
established by a Department of Defense directive 12 and implementing
service regulations, 2 1 it seems logical to expect that administrative law
considerations would be important in determining the extent to which
the courts should grant review of the military determinations.
The administrative scheme established in the service regulations
provides that a serviceman seeking a conscientious objector discharge
or noncombatant status must submit an application in writing to his
immediate commanding officer, providing answers to detailed questions
concerning his beliefs and attaching supporting documents and letters.
The commanding officer is required to talk to the applicant personally,
and to arrange for an interview with a chaplain and a military psychiatrist. Under a recently added provision in the Department of Defense directive1 22 an applicant may request an opportunity to appear
in person before an officer in the grade of 0-3 (captain in the Army and
Air Force, lieutenant in the Navy) or higher, and that the officer will
record his recommendations and reasons therefor. The reports of
these interviews, together with the recommendation of the commanding officer, are forwarded to the appropriate departmental headquarters
official, the Army Adjutant General, the Chief of Naval Personnel or
the Secretary of the Air Force. At this stage the file is referred to
the National Director of Selective Service for an advisory opinion as
to whether the individual would qualify for conscientious objector
status under the Selective Service laws. Although this opinion is not
binding, the departmental headquarters official frequently follows it.'M
120 See note 118 supra.

121 See Army Reg. 635-20 (Dec. 3, 1968); Air Force Reg. 35-14; Bureau of Naval
Personnel Instruction 1616.6.
122 See note 118 supra.
123 DOD [Directive] 1300.6 . . . provides that "claims of conscientious objection by
all persons, whether existing before or after entering military service should be
judged by the same standards." Accordingly, [the headquarters official referred
the application for conscientious objector status] to the Director of the Selective
Service System, General Hershey, for an "advisory opinion" of its validity; the
regulations contemplate that a negative decision by General Hershey will normally be decisive.
Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 709 (2d Cir. 1968). The charge has been made that
the Selective Service had been advising the armed services "to deny applications for discharge on the grounds of conscientious objection . . . for the purpose of discouraging
such in-service applications." Petitioner's Brief for Habeas Corpus at 3, Mandel v.
Dayton, Civil No. 68-2695 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1968) (judgment ordering Coast Guard to
discharge petitioner as conscientious objector).
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Once the official makes his final decision, the applicant must receive
written notice of the decision together with reasons for any denial
of discharge.
While the directive declares that it does not create a vested right in
an individual to be either processed or granted a discharge,12 4 there is
judicial support for the contention that there are certain constitutional
rights (arising out of either the first amendment or the due process
clause of the fifth amendment) upon which a valid claim for court
review of a denial of discharge can be based. 125 The nature of such a
claim and the grounds for attacking a denial of discharge have been
previously suggested:
Obviously, the serviceman whose request for discharge has been denied cannot petition the court for relief, alleging simply that the denial
was unjust; he must also specify the manner in which it was unjust.
From the practical standpoint, he can accomplish this only through
the use of one or more of three basic approaches: 1) an attack on
the final decision, as having been unreasonably, arbitrarily, or discriminatorily made; 2) an attack on the procedural scheme which
the regulations establish, either as lacking the minimum essentials of
constitutional due process or as fostering the denial of equal protection of the laws; 3) an attack on the procedure actually followed
in the particular case, as involving an unlawful departure from the
administrative scheme.2- 6
Suits have been based on all three of these approaches. However,
12 7
broad attacks upon the procedural scheme have not been successful,
and frequently there is no procedural flaw in the processing of an
individual's claim. Thus, suits for review have increasingly been based
on assertions that the denial was arbitrary because it had "no basis
in fact." The "no basis in fact" test, developed in Selective Service
determination review cases,128 appears to have been accepted by the
DOD Directive No. 1300.6 at 2 (May 10, 1968).
See Comment, God, The Army, and Judicial Review: The In-Service Conscientious Objector, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 379, 397-404 (1968). See also Macgill, Selective Conscientious Objection: Divine Will and Legislative Grace, 54 VA. L. REv. 1355 (1968).
126 God, The Army, and Judicial Review, supra note 125, at 404-05.
127 See, e.g., Brown v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1005 (1968), aff'g 263 F. Supp. 686 (D.NJ. 1967); Noyd v. McNamara, 378 F.2d
538 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022, aff'g 267 F. Supp. 701 (D. Colo. 1967).
128 See Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953); Estep v. United States, 327
124

125

U.S. 114 (1946). The test was codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 460(b)(3)
amended, 50 U.S.C.A. app. §460(b)(3) (1968).

(1964), as
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courts in determining whether substantive due process has been accorded by a military body which considers a petition for a conscientious
objector discharge. 9

With the first flood of conscientious objector cases prompted by the
Vietnam War draft, federal courts, having little experience in this
area, tended to accept jurisdiction but then rule against the petitioner
on the merits. 3 0 This pattern, however, was quicldy arrested by two
circuit court decisions. Both Noyd v. McNamara'31 and Brown v.
McNamara 2 refused to grant review to servicemen seeking conscientious objector discharges and Noyd established a strict rule of exhaustion to support its decision, apparently presaging the continued
foreclosure of federal court review in conscientious objector cases' 33
and perhaps other military determinations.
In June 1968, the Second Circuit refused to follow the lead of Noyd
and Brown and in Hammond v. Lenfest-34 allowed review of the claim
of an in-service conscientious objector despite his failure to exhaust
the available military remedies. With two other circuits subsequently
129See Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1968); deRozario v. Commanding Officer, 390 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1967); Crane v. Hedrick, 284 F. Supp. 250 (N.D.
Cal. 1968). But see Brown v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 150, 152-53 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1005 (1968), aff'g 263 F. Supp. 686 (D.NJ. 1967), declining to pass
on whether "no basis in fact" is the appropriate test for review. Although the "no
basis in fact" test has been described as the "narrowest known to the law," Blalock v.
United States, 247 F.2d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1957), it has been applied liberally in Selective
Service cases. See Kessler v. United States, 406 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1969); Lewis v.
Secretary, 402 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1968); Batterton v. United States, 260 F.2d 233 (8th
Cir. 1958); United States v. St. Clair, 293 F. Supp. 337 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). The test may
be required for review of conscientious objector discharges in order to conform to
the scope of review granted to Selective Service conscientious objector determinations.
However, a broader test, such as "substantial evidence," may be appropriate for review of other military administrative determinations. See, e.g., Sanford v. United
States, 399 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1968) (finding determination of Army Board for Correction of Military Records not arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial
evidence).
130 See, e.g., In re Kanewske, 260 F. Supp. 521 (N.D. Cal. 1966), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Kanewske v. Nitze, 383 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1967); Gilliam v. Reaves, 263 F. Supp.
378 (W.D. La. 1966).
131 378 F.2d 538 (10th Cir. 1967).
132 387 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1967).
133 Capt. Noyd, for example, has still not exhausted his military remedies (which
would allow him to obtain a review on the merits) although two years have passed
since his suit in the United States District Court for injunctive relief was denied on
the grounds of failure to exhaust remedies. See text at notes 177-81 infra.
134 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968).
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reaching the same result as Hammond," and the Supreme Court's denial
of certiorari in both Noyd"8 and Brown,"37 there is a temporarily
irreconcilable split among the circuits. While the issue may be avoided
if the military continues its recent trend towards allowing conscientious
objector discharges' 33 and broadens the defenses of conscientious objectors in military courts-martial,' 39 such a result is indeed unlikely. The
resolution therefore, will probably have to come from the courts. If
the courts continue to follow Hammond by hearing cases on the merits,
the Noyd doctrine may eventually be rejected as an overly strict
reaction to sensitive political issues; such a development would open
the way for increased review of military determinations in numerous
areas. In order to determine if indeed the courts will take this approach in the future, a detailed look must first be taken at Noyd,

Brown and Hammond.
Noyd v. McNamara
Captain Dale Noyd became an Air Force officer in 1955, pursued
graduate studies in psychology at the University of Michigan for
three years from 1960 to 1963 under an Air Force education program,
and was then assigned as an Assistant Professor of Psychology at
the United States Air Force Academy. On December 8, 1966, he
submitted a letter of resignation to the Secretary of the Air Force,
stating that he was "opposed to the war that this country is waging
in Vietnam" 140 and in subsequent letters requested that he be reassigned
to duties providing minimum conflict with his beliefs or, alternatively,
that he be discharged as a conscientious objector. All his requests
were denied and he eventually received orders assigning him to fighter
pilot training, creating the probability that he would thereafter be sent
to Vietnam. He thereupon filed a suit in federal court seeking declara135 In re Kelly, 401 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1968); Bates v. Commanding Officer, Misc. Civil
No. 68-64-F (D. Mass. Oct. 29, 1968), rev'd, No. 7241 (1st Cir. Jan. 7, 1969).

1"6 389 U.S. 1022 (1967).

137 390 U.S. 1005 (1968).
138 See, e.g., consent order for discharge entered by Coast Guard in Mandel v.
Dayton, Civil No. 68-2695 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1968), described in N.Y. Times, Sept. 4,
1968, at 14, col. 4.
l 3 9 For a case which may result in a more liberal approach to conscientious objectors
within the military, see United States v. Noyd, A.C.M. 20,121 (Sept. 3, 1968), appeal
docketed, No. 21,642, U.S.C.M.A. Jan. 23, 1969. See notes 225-26 infra and accompanying text.
140Noyd v. McNamara, 267 F. Supp. 701, 703 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 378 F.2d 538 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022 (1967).
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tory relief, an injunction, and writs of habeas corpus and mandamus
to require the Air Force either to assign him to duties consistent with his
beliefs or to dismiss him. His alleged bases for relief were first, that
his application was improperly and discriminatorily denied in violation
of his rights under the Constitution, statutes and regulations; second,
that the pertinent Air Force regulation lacked minimum criteria of
procedural due process; and third, that the Air Force had failed to
give reasons for disapproval of his application as required in its own
regulation.
The district court' 41 concluded that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit because Noyd had not yet been court-martialed for refusing to obey orders and appealed any conviction through all military
appeal channels. The court mingled the policy reasons for the exhaustion rule freely with the reasons for a general policy of nonreviewability:
There is good reason for the strict requirement of exhaustion
as a prerequisite to jurisdiction. In part it is based on the separation
of powers and particularly the desirability of allowing the military
to govern its own affairs without interference from the courts. If
courts were allowed to entertain these suits at any stage of the military proceedings, the delays incident to litigation could of themselves
render military orders ineffectual. 14
The court relied heavily upon the nonreviewability doctrine decisions,' 4-3 and appears to have viewed the exhaustion doctrine as just
another vehicle for preventing review of military determinations.
Although Noyd argued that he was only obligated to pursue the
remedies provided in the procedural regulation pertaining to conscientious objectors, the court rejected this contention with references to
44
cases that had also confused exhaustion with nonreviewability.' Similarly, although Noyd argued that requiring him to violate military
14 Id. at 708.
142 Id.
143

at 707.

Id. at

706.

144Eschewing substantive analysis, the court merely cited three district court decisions which had freely intermixed exhaustion and nonreviewability principles and
indeed, had relied to a great extent on the concepts of Orloff, see text at note 63 supra.
The three cases cited were: Brown v. McNamara, 263 F. Supp. 686 (D.N.J.), aff'd,
387 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1005 (1968); Chevez v. Fergusson,
266 F. Supp. 879 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Petition of Green, 156 F. Supp. 174 (S.D. Cal.
1957), appeal dismissed as moot, 264 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1959).
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law and risk court-martial in order to secure review would unreasonably
place him in jeopardy, and indeed would be futile in view of the past
rejections of his claim, the court dismissed these considerations by
cursory references to cases not involving administrative remedies.'4 5
Aside from failing to delineate the policy considerations relevant in
exhaustion situations, the court seemed unaware of the implications of
requiring exhaustion of an entire set of military judicial remedies
which had no connection with the administrative scheme governing
conscientious objector discharges. In a per curiam decision, the Tenth
Circuit adopted the lower court's opinion, merely adding a few words
4
to endorse the district court's view of the exhaustion issue.' "
145 In answer to Noyd's contention that a refusal to grant him relief in court "would
unreasonably force him to violate military law" and that this is contrary to the theory
and purpose of declaratory proceedings, 267 F. Supp. at 706, the court merely stated
that the cases did not support this argument and cited two cases involving the nonreviewability doctrines, Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885); Orloff v. Willoughby,
345 U.S. 83 (1953), and two decisions involving attempts to obtain court review of
court-martial rather than administrative determinations, Gusik v. Schilder 340 U.S.
128 (1950); Gorko v. Commanding Officer, 314 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1963).
146 Although appellant has exhausted his administrative remedies as that term is concerned with Air Force regulations, he has not exhausted the military process and
has not been denied, nor can we anticipate that he will be denied, a full consideration of his constitutional rights within the complete scope of that process.
Noyd v. McNamara, 378 F.2d 538, 539-40 (10th Cir. 1967).
Noyd also offered an argument based upon Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965) (upholding federal court injunction of threatened state court prosecutions under
vague state statutes to prevent "chilling effect" on first amendment rights). Noyd
argued that the doctrine of Dombrovski should be expanded to afford injunctive relief
to assure determination of his first amendment right to religious freedom without
exposure to court-martial proceedings, on the theory that if such exposure were a prerequisite to judicial relief, other individuals with meritorious conscientious objection
claims would be deterred from asserting their right to free exercise because of punishment and the absence of a ready means of redress. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at
23-25, Noyd v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 1022 (1967). The Second Circuit had recently
found a "chilling effect" sufficient to justify federal court intervention in a Selective
Service context. Wolff v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir.
1967). However, the Tenth Circuit rejected the Dombrowski argument as "contrary to
established law," citing only pre-Dombrowski cases. 378 F.2d at 540 n.2.
Noyd's argument was limited by the fact that no court has yet extended Dombrowski
to a military context, that it is yet unclear whether the right to conscientious objection
status is constitutionally protected under the first amendment, see Macgill, Selective
Conscientious Objection: Divine Will and Legislative Grace, 54 VA. L. RPv. 1355,
1385-93 (1968); Mansfield, Conscientious Objection-1964 Term, in 1965 RELIGION AND
TIM PUBLIC OPRDER 1, 59-67, and that both Dombrowski and Wolff concerned the exercise of free speech rather than the free exercise of religion. The question of Dombrowski's application to the military has been raised unsuccessfully in the free speech
context in Levy v. Corcoran, 389 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 960 (1967),

512
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Brown v. McNamara
Private Brown, after enlisting in the United States Army and serving
two weeks of basic training, applied for a conscientious objector discharge on the grounds that his beliefs had crystallized to the point
that he was compelled to refuse to serve in the military. He complied
with all the military procedures and submitted documentation of the
sincerity of his claim, but the advisory opinion of the Director of
Selective Service was that Brown could not be properly classified as a
conscientious objector and thereafter the Adjutant General denied his
application. Brown then refused to draw combat equipment and after
being court-martialed, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
alleging: (1) that denial of his application was arbitrary and without
basis in fact, thus violating the applicable statutes and regulations and
the due process clause of the fifth amendment, and (2) that the
procedures in the regulations denied him equal protection of the law
because he was not given the hearing rights accorded those seeking
conscientious objector status prior to entering the armed forces. The
district court decision 47 first disposed of the attack on the statutory
and regulatory provisions by finding that they did not result in a denial
of equal protection, but then found that it had no jurisdiction to review
the final determination of the Adjutant General. Relying on the
nonreviewability language in Orloff,-48 the court refused to address
even the limited question of whether the military determination had
any basis in fact. 4 9
While the court's decision was essentially based on the doctrine of
nonreviewability and it never explicitly mentioned the exhaustion principle, it nevertheless emphasized the timing aspect of the attempt to
obtain court review, 1 ° which is clearly related to the problem of
in an attempt to prevent the military from court-martialing an officer on charges arising out of activities he claimed were protected by the first amendment.
147 263 F. Supp. 686 (D.N.J. 1967), aft'd, 387 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1005 (1968). This decision was rendered prior to the district court decision in
Noyd and was cited in that decision, 267 F. Supp. at 708.
148 See text at note 63 supra.
149 263 F. Supp. at 693.
150 The Court distinguished the precedents permitting federal court review of preinduction classification by a draft board, and of the form of discharge, on the basis of
their timing:
Such litigation at the beginning and end of the military term of service is not
nearly as disruptive to the function of the armed services as that which threatens
the very utilization of the manpower which has been assembled for active service.
Id. The court also expressed concern lest the military become "entangled in litigation"
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exhaustion. Indeed, the district court opinion was subsequently cited
by the district court in Noyd for the proposition that exhaustion
of remedies is required in cases seeking review of conscientious objector
determinations,' "5 and the circuit court noted that Brown had not
12
yet exhausted all his military remedies.
By the time Brown's appeal had reached the Third Circuit, the
Tenth Circuit's opinion in Noyd had already been decided. The Third
Circuit, with separate opinions by the three judges, affirmed the
district court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus, but not on the
grounds suggested by the lower court. Judge Van Dusen's leading
opinion began by affirming the lower court's conclusion "that the
administrative scheme set up by the Department of Defense and the
Army does not of itself result in any constitutional violation." 153
While making this determination, however, the opinion specifically
stated, contrary to the district court's contention, that the federal
courts have power to review questions involving procedural due process, 15 4 presumably including review of the procedure used at a specific
trial. Judge Van Dusen then held that the bases for refusal in this case
were neither arbitrary nor irrational. 15
The decision thus appears to be explicable as a judgment that the
court had jurisdiction to review at least some aspects of the military
determination but that there was in this case a basis in fact for the
denial. Despite this seemingly liberal approach, Judge Van Dusen continued to flirt with the lower court's view of nonreviewability and
the stringent use of exhaustion in Noyd. Although stating that the
and face problems in the assignment of a conscientious objector claimant while the
civilian courts were considering his case, and pointed to the superior efficiency of
military tribunals in reaching a prompt and final decision. Id.The latter consideration
is somewhat mitigated by the fact that federal courts are required to dispose of habeas
corpus petitions without delay and that if petitioner were successful, injunctive relief
might be granted immediately.
151267 F. Supp. at 707-08.
152 387 F.2d at 153 n.5. Unlike Capt. Noyd, Brown had already been court-martialed,
but all his reviews and appeals and a possible petition for new trial had not yet been
exhausted.
153 Id.at 152.
154 Id.

'65Id. at 153. In the court's view, factors such as that Brown made his claim only
six weeks after enlisting and that his chaplain and commanding officer conditioned their
opinions as to his sincerity indicated that 'Private Brown's petition presents no claim
sufficiently unique, nor does his position show such injustice, that we are compelled to
interfere in whatever internal avenues of appeal are available to him within the Army."
Id.at 154.
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court need not decide whether complete exhaustion is always an
indispensable prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction,'". he added
in a footnote:
Claimed "conscientious objector" status can always be raised as a
defense to prosecution for refusing to obey orders. From any judgment or sentence, comprehensive appeal is available. 10 U.S.C. §§ 817,
859-876. This includes resort to a board of review (10 U.S.C. § 866),
to the Court of Military Appeals (10 U.S.C. § 867), to the Secretary of
the Army (10 U.S.C. § 874), and petition for a new trial (10 U.S.C.
§ 873). Appellant has not pursued all these available remedies. 1 7
Judge Van Dusen's colleagues were in fundamental disagreement
with respect to the question of jurisdiction. Judge Maris felt that the
court had jurisdiction to review and that Brown was entitled to
reversal on the merits, 58 while Chief Judge Staley agreed with the
lower court that the exercise of such jurisdiction was unduly disruptive
of the operation of the armed forces and contrary to the doctrine of
the separation of powers.' 9 Thus, Brown stands as something of a
watershed, with all three positions expressed-the old absolute rule of
nonreviewability, acceptance of reviewability, and the Noyd interpretation of the exhaustion rule. However, Judge Van Dusen's willingness
to consider the case on the merits, despite his hesitation to express a
view on the applicability of the exhaustion doctrine, was a break from
the stringency of opinions like Noyd and Brown in the district court.
One can only conjecture whether, if Judge Van Dusen had found
no basis in fact for the denial of Brown's application, he would have
granted the relief requested without full exhaustion of the court-martial
appeals.

Hammond v. Lenfest
Hammond, who had enlisted in the U.S. Naval Reserve in 1963 when
he was seventeen years old, became attracted to the Society of Friends
while in college and in 1966 he became a member of a local "Meeting."
On March 17, 1967, he submitted a request to the commanding officer
of his reserve unit for a conscientious objector discharge. The request
was denied by the Chief of Naval Personnel after the Director of the
156 Id. at 152.
'-7 Id. at 153 n.5.

IN8 Id. at 154.
159 Id.
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Selective Service System, General Hershey, rendered an adverse advisory opinion. Hammond refused to continue to attend reserve drills
and was thereupon ordered to report for two years active duty. One
week prior to the date on which he had been ordered to report, he
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the District Court for
Connecticut, asserting that denial of his request for discharge was
without basis in fact and violated the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.
The district court, citing Orloff, Noyd and Brown, ruled that it had
no jurisdiction over the case because Hammond had failed to exhaust
the available administrative and military remedies. 160 The Second Circuit
reversed and remanded."6 After paying his respects to the nonreviewability doctrine at the outset of his opinion,' Judge Kaufman went on
to cite Burns v. Wilsonles as indicating "that in appropriate circumstances even a court martial proceeding-the ultimate method of enforcing discipline-could be reviewed in a civil court on an application
for a writ of habeas corpus," - and Harmon v. Brucker 63 as authority
that federal courts possess jurisdiction to review military discharges.1 6
Judge Kaufman's approach indicated that the old nonreviewability cases
could no longer be relied upon to bar all review of military determinations, and thus a refusal to hear Hammond would have to be based
on narrower grounds relating to the exhaustion of remedies.
After determining that Hammond, although not on active duty, was
"in custody" so that habeas corpus would lie.167 Judge Kaufman considered the exhaustion question. Distinguishing Noyd as susceptible of
being read as a mere application of the settled doctrine that the federal
courts will not interfere with duty assignments of persons lawfully in
the armed forces, 6" the opinion further rejected any implication in Noyd
160 Opinion of Judge Zampano, D. Conn., has not been reported.

161 Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968).
1621d. at 710, quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953).
163 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
164 398 F.2d at 710.
165 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (per curiam).
166 398 F.2d at 710. The court also cited an address by Chief justice Warren as
questioning the policy of treating the military as an enclave beyond the reach of civilian
courts. See Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 181, 188
(1962).
167 398 F.2d at 711-12. But see United States ex rel. O'Hare v. Eichstaedt, 285 F. Supp.
476 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
168 398 F.2d at 713. This same approach was taken in Crane v. Hedrick, 284 F. Supp.
250 (N.D. Cal. 1968), which was decided after the appeal in Haranond was argued
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that a court-martial is a prerequisite for federal court review of the
claim that the petitioner, at the time of bringing suit, is not lawfully
in the armed forces. By analogy to the state prisoner's right to habeas
corpus, the court then noted that exhaustion was not an absolute bar
to jurisdictional power:
[A]ssuming arguendo that Hammond's predicament can be analogized
to that of a state prisoner petitioning for federal relief, it is settled that
the doctrine requiring the exhaustion of available state remedies is not
one defining power but one which governs the proper exercise of
power ... and is rooted in considerations of comity rather than in
the scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction ....
169
Also recognizing the administrative law origins of the exhaustion doctrine, the court reasoned that if the court-martial is analogized to an
administrative rather than a judicial remedy, "there is even less reason
to require Hammond to be court martialled on the facts of this case." 170
The objectives of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, the
court found, would not be met by requiring Hammond to subject
himself to court-martial as a prerequisite to court review, for Hammond
had already received the determination of General Hershey, the highest
official in the administrative chain with the ultimate administrative
expertise. Furthermore, resort to remedies in the court-martial area
appeared to offer no real remedy for Hammond. He had no power
to convene a court-martial, but even if one were convened, the court
noted, there was no indication "that presenting a conscientious objector
claim as a defense to a charge of violating military law by failing to
but before a decision was rendered. Crane involved an apprentice seaman who had
enlisted in the Navy and, after a month of active duty, had applied for a conscientious
objector discharge which was denied. He went AWOL just prior to the scheduled
departure of his ship for Vietnam, and petitioned for habeas corpus seeking an order
that he be discharged. After distinguishing Noyd, the court rejected the view of the
exhaustion doctrine as requiring submission to a court-martial:
If respondents' contentions were to prevail, the only way one in petitioner's
position could raise his constitutional claims of wrongful detention would be by
first committing a crime and facing the possibility of imprisonment. Neither
Congress nor the majority of the federal courts has been willing to exact that
price of persons seeking such relief.
284 F. Supp. at 253. The court made no further analysis of the policies which make
the requirement of subjection to court-martial inappropriate, but the decision, coming
at the moment that the Second Circuit was preparing its opinion in Hammond, no
doubt lent support to a rejection of the Noyd rule.
169 398 F.2d at 714.
170 Id.
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obey orders would be anything more than a futile and ritualistic
gesture." 171
Judge Friendly's dissent relied heavily upon nonreviewability
precedents, and argued further that since Hammond had voluntarily
enlisted and enjoyed the privileges of reserve status for four and a
half years, he should not now be relieved of the obligations.17 2 By
placing special emphasis upon the contractual nature of voluntary enlistment, Judge Friendly raised the possibility that court interference
with military discharge policies might have an adverse effect on
military recruitment. Concerning the exhaustion question, he argued
that it is incorrect to assume that a court-martial might not be convened since "there is little doubt that the Navy is ready to set its
disciplinary machinery in motion if Hammond persists in refusing to
report for active duty, once the district court lifts its stay." 173 Furthermore, the court-martial would not be an exercise in futility since "[i]t
would be well within the competence of a court martial to rule that,
in the absence of evidence supporting General Hershey's 'advisory
opinion,' it would follow the recommendation of Commanding Officer
Lenfest .
*..." 174 These contentions,
if proven, would undoubtedly
weaken the majority's argument. If it were a certainty that Hammond
would be court-martialed and that full consideration would be given
his claims of unlawful and unconstitutional denial of discharge, then
the court-martial might provide an adequate remedy and might properly be viewed as a genuine remedial step which should be exhausted.
However, it would still be questionable whether the additional courtmartial remedy should be grafted onto the administrative remedies,
causing an almost endless chain of remedial hurdles.
Judge Friendly's arguments focus the debate essentially on the question of adequacy of remedy-whether the court-martial and its appeals

would provide Hammond a full and fair review of the Secretary's administrative determination. Despite Judge Kaufman's suggestion that
the Navy might not court-martial Hammond and thereby stall his
appeal process, 175 the true concern of the court appeared to be the fact
that a different kind of tribunal, criminal in nature, had been added
to the administrative chain of remedies and that the petitioner would
171 1d. at 713.
172 id. at 717.
173 Id.
174d.
175 id. at 714.
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therefore be forced to take affirmative and unlawful action in order
to obtain the ultimate remedy he sought. Indeed, even if the likelihood
were strong that Hammond would be court-martialed, military law
indicates that Hammond would not be able to raise the wrongful denial
of his discharge at the military proceeding;71' in a recent review of
the case of Captain Noyd, the Air Force Board of Review found no
error in the fact that at his court-martial for failure to accept a duty
assignment, Noyd was not permitted to raise as a defense the alleged
unconstitutionality of the denial of a conscientious objector discharge.'7 7 The military courts refused to entertain Noyd's claims on the
grounds that only the federal courts had jurisdiction to review such
administrative determinations. As Noyd himself expressed it:
The Air Force Board of Review did not "uphold" the requirement
of universal pacifism for conscientious objection: it merely approved
the court-martial's exclusion of this issue and the legality of the denial
of my C.O. applications.
The distinction is not trivial. I have been before five courts and have
yet to obtain a ruling on the merits. The Air Force successfully opposed my Federal court suit by arguing that proper forum was the
military judiciary; now, with consummate agility, they maintain the
178
converse.
The Board of Review decision in Noyd would appear to weaken
substantially the positions of Judge Van Dusen in Brown 79 and Judge
Friendly in Hammond8 0 regarding the possibility of raising a conscien17tSee United States v. Dunn, 38 C.M.R. 917 (1968); United States v. Taylor, 37
C.M.R. 547 (1966).
177 United States v. Noyd, A.C.M. 20,121 (Sept. 3, 1968), appeal docketed, No. 21,642,

U.S.C.M.A., Jan. 23, 1969. The Air Force Board decision cited with approval, United
States v. Dunn, 38 C.M.R. 917 (1968), in which the defendant had attempted to obtain
review of the denial of a conscientious objector discharge at his court-martial for
disobeying a lawful order:
The obvious answer is that such judicial review was not within the jurisdiction
of the court-martial which tried the accused. The jurisdiction of a court-martial
is a very limited jurisdiction derived from the power of the Congress, in Article I,
In its exercise of this power, the
Section 8, Clause 14, of the Constitution ....
Congress did not include in the Uniform Code of Military Justice a grant of
jurisdiction to military tribunals to review such administrative determinations.
Id. at 920.
178 N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1968, Letters to the Editor, at 32, col. 8.
179 387 F.2d at 153 n.5.
180 398 F.2d at 717. Violations of regulations concerning treatment of conscientious
objector applicants have been successfully raised as a defense to court-martial for
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tious objector claim as a defense in a court-martial for refusing to
obey orders.
Even if this decision were reversed by the Court of Military Appeals' 8 '
and evidence of a wrongful denial of discharge were allowed as a defense
in a court-martial, there is still considerable question whether an
alleged conscientious objector should be forced to go into the criminal
sphere to obtain a remedy and whether that remedy, if permitted,
is adequate. Presumably the evidence would only be admissible with
respect to a defense of justification for the act which brought about
the court-martial. Such a defense would not necessarily involve a full
refusal to obey orders. E.g., United States v. Sigmon, C.M. 416,356 (Jan. 2, 1968) (in
a court-martial for disobeying the order of a superior to board a bus which would
transport him to a Vietnam-bound plane, soldier could claim as a defense that he had
applied for a conscientious objector discharge and therefore could not, under Army
regulations (AR 635-20), be moved from his unit or assigned duties in conflict with his
beliefs); United States v. Quirk, C.M. 416,445 (May 31, 1968) (violations of AR 600-200
may be raised as a defense to court-martial for refusing to draw a weapon and join
a platoon in drill).
181 On January 23, 1969, the Court of Military Appeals granted review of the Noyd
court-martial, see note 139 supra, and one of the assignments of error is the Law
Officer's exclusion of evidence concerning the wrongfulness of the Secretary's denial
of a conscientious objector discharge. Certain considerations might work in favor of
a reversal of the Board of Review's decision. The Court of Military Appeals has been
particularly aware that if the military fails to provide opportunity for a fair review of
arbitrary and unconstitutional military actions, there will be no recourse but to permit
expanded collateral attacks on military determinations in the federal courts. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bevilacqua, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 10, 11-12, 39 C.M.R. 10, 11-12 (1968).
The fact that the military had granted virtually no conscientious objector discharges
until the federal courts finally began to order discharges where there was no basis in fact
for the denial has probably not escaped the Court of Military Appeals. The Central
Committee for Conscientious Objectors advised in its handbook: "[a]lthough many
men were discharged on grounds of conscience previous to the Spring of 1966, since
that time almost all discharges have been denied regardless of merit." CENTRAL ComUiTMTE FOR

CONSCIENTIOUS

OBJECTORS,

HANDBOOK

FOR

CONSCIENTIOUS

OBjEcroRs

91

(10th ed. 1968). Statistics provided by the Department of Defense in November, 1968
(unpublished) show for the Army:
Year
C.O. Discharge Applications
Discharges Approved
1961
8
1
1962
5
2
1963
69
29
1964
62
30
1965
101
26
1966
118
5
1967
185
9
1968 thru Oct.
264
44
with slightly higher discharge percentages for the Navy and considerably higher for
the Air Force.
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review of the administrative decision of the Secretary. Furthermore,
the court-martial would have no particular expertise in determining
the question of eligibility for a conscientious objector discharge, and
indeed, reality suggests, as did petitioner Hammond, that there is a
largely of military
probability that a court-martial panel composed
82
officers would be less than open-minded.1
While these considerations are inherently subjective in nature and
thus difficult to evaluate, federal courts have often inquired into difficult
questions concerning the adequacy of state appellate procedures and
the fairness of state practices.1' 3 A similar inquiry as to whether a courtmartial provides the conscientious objector an adequate forum for
review would almost certainly appear to raise serious doubts about the
validity of the process supported by the dissenting opinion in Hammond.
A Critique
The foregoing decisions dealing with review of conscientious objector
discharge denials have touched upon various aspects of the exhaustion
of remedies doctrine without fully examining the policy considerations
behind the doctrine. While the doctrine is clearly concerned with preserving the balance of authority between competing systems of decisionmaking, it does so by regulating the timeliness of court review rather
than the ultimate availability of review.'84 The objectives of exhaustion
as applied to the military-federal court balance of authority seem to be
threefold: First, to prevent premature court review which could upset
the balance of power between the military (as a separate, functioning
judicial and administrative system) and the civilian judiciary; second,
to prevent interference with the efficient operation of the military
judicial and administrative systems which could deny the military the
182 Brief for Appellant at 9, Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968). The
disciplinary philosophy is still present in the administration of courts-martial and,
because of the compromise made in the Uniform Code of Military Justice of 1951,
which left the administration of courts-martial under the control of commanders and
failed to provide the serviceman with a jury of his peers, see Morgan, The Background
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 28 MmIlTARY L. Rav. 17 (1965); Sherman,
Revised Military Code: A Qualified Assent, TRiAL 44, 46 (Dec.-Jan., 1968-9); Sherman,
Military Injustice, 73 CASE AND CoiAETar 40-45 (July-Aug., 1968), there is some doubt
as to whether servicemen can obtain adequate consideration of their conscientious objector beliefs from a court-martial.
183H. M. HART & H. WECHSLmR, supra note 26, at 510-17, 527-45.

184 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 418 (1963); Jaffe, supra note 28, at 328.
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opportunity to exercise its expertise before resort to the courts; and
third, to prevent inefficient use of judicial resources by requiring "finality" within the military judicial and administrative systems so that
needless review can be avoided.
The first consideration appears to be the principal concern of decisions such as Bro'wn, Noyd, and Judge Friendly's dissent in Hammond.
By mixing nonreviewability language with the exhaustion doctrine,
these opinions have expressed the concern that court review will rob
the military of its autonomy and interfere with its operations. It
appears, however, that phrasing the exhaustion doctrine in terms of
complete denial of review is a misapplication of the doctrine. The
exhaustion doctrine, with its historical functions of requiring finality
before appellate review, exhaustion of legal remedies before granting
equitable jurisdiction, exhaustion of state remedies before granting
federal habeas corpus, and exhaustion of administrative remedies before
court review, does not bar jurisdiction but rather permits consideration
of timing and comity by a court in deciding whether to exercise its
proper jurisdiction and review a case at a particular time. A court applying the exhaustion doctrine has jurisdiction but chooses to withhold
consideration of the issues until the completion of a foreign decisionmaking process.18 5 To the extent that the courts have relied on the
total nonreviewability of military determinations, a concept that has
been eroded in recent years, they have ignored their crucial role of
weighing relevant facts and policy considerations in determining
whether to apply the exhaustion doctrine.
Whether court review at a particular time will, in fact, rob the
military of its rightful autonomy and interfere with its operations must
be determined on the basis of the circumstances of each case. Relevant
considerations might include, for example, the status of the petitioner.
Hammond argued in his brief that he was only a reservist, rather than
on active duty, and that his discharge would thus have a less disruptive effect on military manpower stability.18 6 Hammond also argued
that because there was no indication that there are large numbers of
in-service conscientious objectors, review would not substantially affect
the military.8 7 This argument, however, does not take into consideration the possibility that if courts were to grant review freely to in185 See Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 132 (1950); Ogden v. Zuckert, 298 F.2d 312,

317 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
186 Brief for Appellant at 9, Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968).
187 d. at 18.
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service conscientious objectors, the number of such applications would
increase, a factor that a court must weigh in making its determination.
The possibility of delay and consequent misuse of military manpower
as a result of premature court review is another relevant consideration
for the court. This factor was cited in Brown both in favor of and
against review. The district court argued that part of the armed forces
would be rendered "immobile and entangled in litigation" 188 if federal
court review were permitted, while the appellant in Hammond maintained that because habeas corpus petitions must be heard and acted
upon promptly, the effect on the military would be insignificant.'
A further consideration in applying exhaustion is whether court
review would, in fact, have an adverse effect upon military discipline
and the efficient operation of military personnel programs. Because
the military has a tendency to reject any change in the status quo as a
threat to good order and discipline, 19 0 courts must be wary of accepting
arguments that military discipline will be destroyed if, for example, a
conscientious objector can obtain court review and require the military
to discharge him. Indeed, the argument has been made that conscientious objectors are rarely assimilated into the military and that disruption
would in fact be reduced by a liberal discharge policy.'91
A final relevant factor is the type of military determination which
is being attacked. For example, cases seeking court review of a particular duty assignment or transfer overseas involve greater interference
with the military than do cases seeking review of denial of a conscientious objector discharge, since duty assignments require more
discretion by military authorities, and the potential for an avalanche
of suits for review is greater.
It must be remembered that counterbalanced against the interest of
the military in preserving its autonomy and effectiveness is the interest
of the individual serviceman in having a prompt and effective means
of protecting his rights. The balancing of the interests of the system
against those of the individual is present in administrative law, and
is expressed in certain principles already mentioned:' 92 Exhaustion of
263 F. Supp. at 692.
Brief for Appellant at 15, Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968).
190 See, e.g., the comments by Professor Morgan, Chief Drafter of the UCMJ, regarding military opposition to the reforms embodied in the UCMJ. Morgan, supra
note 182.
191 See Macgill, Selective Conscientious Objection: Divine Will and Legislative
Grace,supra note 146, at 1385.
192 See notes 80-85 supra and accompanying text.
188
189
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remedies is not necessary where the available remedies are inadequate,
where irreparable injury would occur, or where constitutional rights
are involved. These principles must be considered thoroughly in the
military context.
As suggested above, there is substantial doubt as to whether a courtmartial will hear a conscientious objector's claim of improper denial,
and whether such hearing, if allowed, would be adequate. The adequacy of the court-martial remedy is also affected by the promptness

of available review. In Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local
Board 11,193 Justice Harlan recently agreed with the majority that a
ministerial student who had been denied an express exemption from
the draft was entitled to federal court review of the draft board's
determination despite the existence of a federal statute forbidding
review of board determinations. In his opinion, however, Justice
Harlan suggested that the constitutionality of a summary administrative
deprivation of liberty may turn on the availability of a prompt, subsequent hearing. 19 4 Applying this to the Oestereich case, Harlan determined that such hearing was not meaningfully provided by the option
of defending a criminal prosecution for refusing to report for induction
or filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after induction into
the armed forces.
If this reasoning is applied to the situation in Hammond or Noyd,
it surely raises doubts about the adequacy of the court-martial remedy
for the in-service conscientious objector who desires to appeal the
allegedly unconstitutional rejection of his discharge. Indeed, Captain
Noyd's case, which is just now reaching the Court of Military Appeals
more than a year after he was court-martialed, attests to the fact that
the court-martial and its attendant appeals is a painfully slow process.
The lack of a prompt disposition of an alleged wrongful administrative
determination clearly affects the adequacy of the court-martial remedy
and weighs in favor of permitting court review of these claims.
The principle that exhaustion is not required when it would occasion
irreparable injuries, or when constitutional rights are involved, should
also be considered in balancing the serviceman's interests against those
of the military. Quite apart from the possible chilling effect on the
exercise of constitutional rights, an effect created by postponing a serviceman's ability to obtain review, the petitioner himself may suffer
irreparable injuries in the interim. He is subjected to the anxiety,
193 393 U.S. 233, 239-44 (1968)
194 Id. at 243 n.6.

(concurring opinion).
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discomfort, and possible expense of defending against criminal charges,
and of being in an uncertain position for the considerable time required to exhaust the court-martial process. Furthermore, since a
convicted serviceman is required to begin serving his sentence before
his appeals are made, 19 5 he may serve a substantial portion of his sentence before his remedies are finally exhausted and hence, before ever
getting into a federal court. When constitutional issues are involved,
one reason for waiving exhaustion is that administrative bodies often
lack the expertise and authority to render a decision on constitutionality.
For example, it has been suggested that both selective service boards 9"
and boards for correction of records 9 7 are incompetent to determine
questions concerning the constitutionality of an act of Congress. It
would indeed be unreasonable to allow administrative tribunals and nonfederal court systems to make determinations regarding the constitutional validity of federal statutes'918 if such determinations are to become
effectively binding on litigants because of exhaustion requirements.
Because the conscientious objector discharge suits have generally in195Noyd v. Bond, 402 F.2d 441 (10 Cir. 1968), non-incarcerated status granted, 89
S. Ct. 478 (1968), cert. granted, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969).
-96 Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 242 (1968) (concurring opinion); Wills v. United States, 384 F.2d 943, 945 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 908 (1968). In a recent case it was held inter alia that defendant, when prosecuted for refusal to submit to induction, could challenge the constitutionality of the
draft laws although he had not raised this question before his dhaft board. "Whatever may be academic theory, no administrative agency, such as a draft board, believes it has the power or, practically, would exercise power, to declare unconstitutional the statute under which it operates." United States v. Sisson, Crim. No. 68-237-W
para. 6 (D. Mass, April 1, 1969) (Wyzanski, CJ.).
197 Nelson v. Miller, 373 F.2d 474, 480-81 (3d Cit. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 924
(1967). But see Craycroft v. Ferrall, 37 U.S.L.W. 2542 (9th Cir. March 5, 1969),
holding that naval reservists who had been denied conscientious objection discharges
must apply to the Navy Board for the Correction of Military Records before seeking
federal court relief. There is considerable doubt as to the adequacy of the remedy
offered by the Boards for the Correction of Military Records. Although an Air Force
Board recently ordered the discharge of an airman who had been denied a conscientious objector discharge, David T. Bezouska, 1 SSLR 3163 (A.F. Bd. for Correc.
of Mil. Rec. May 7, 1968), such boards have not generally given attention to corrective relief until discharge is completed, Nelson v. Miller, supra at 479, and do not
appear to possess the expertise required for review of in-service determinations such
as refusal to grant a conscientious objector discharge, see note 103 supra. All the
cases cited in Craycroft for the proposition that the boards are an administrative
remedy which must be exhausted involved attempts to prevent discharge and findings
that the boards provide an adequate post-discharge remedy for review and correction.
Contra, Brooks v. Clifford, 37 U.S.L.W. 2542 (4th Cir. March 20, 1969); Gann v.
Wilson, 289 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Cal. 1968)
198 See generally H. M. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 26, at 136, 523-27, 539-45.
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volved substantial attacks upon the constitutionality of both the federal
statutory scheme and the regulations promulgated thereunder, a question is raised not only as to the competency of a court-martial to make
such constitutional determinations, but as to whether the forced delay
in obtaining a federal court determination is in keeping with the
constitutional balance of powers and guarantee of individual rights.
As observed above, the basic function of the exhaustion doctrine
in the military context is not only to balance military and civilian
judicial power, but also to utilize fully administrative expertise and to
insure finality. These latter objectives must also be considered in the
light of the circumstances of each case. It would appear that whatever expertise the military has in processing conscientious objector
discharges is exhausted in the determination made by the Adjutant
General (after receiving the opinion of the Director of Selective
Service), and that a court-martial convened to try a serviceman for
refusing to obey orders has no special administrative expertise concerning
the discharge issue. The argument that a court-martial itself offers
additional expertise as it is composed of military men who are familiar
with military problems overlooks the fact that a court-martial is
basically a criminal court, and its function is distinct from that of the
administrative scheme for processing discharge applications.
The objective of finality might be satisfied by judicial inquiry into
whether the last administrative step which a petitioner has taken appears
to be the logical end of available remedies from which he can obtain
relief. Under this test, it might be argued that in Hammond the decision
of the Adjutant General left no further step under the administrative
scheme, while in Brown petitioner had been court-martialed and could
have appealed the decision of that tribunal. In his opinion in Hammond,
Judge Kaufman evidently believed this to be an important distinction
since he distinguished Gusik v. Sohilder 99 as a case in which the
"petitioner had already been court martialed and the Court simply
concluded that once that route had been traversed, it was incumbent
upon him to exhaust his appeal to the Judge Advocate General." 200
Hammond, on the other hand, had no further step to take in the
logical progression of his remedies. Unlike the strict approach to
exhaustion in Noyd, which relies heavily upon principles of nonreviewability found in Orloff, this suggested approach would more easily
permit consideration of both the appropriate principles of administrative
199 340 U.S. 128 (1950).
200 398 F.2d at 713.

526
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law and the needs of the military in light of the unique circumstances
of each case. Hammond v. Lenfest is a step in this direction because
it offers, for the first time, an interest-balancing approach which is not
preconditioned by the absolutes of nonreviewability.20 '
THE EFFECT OF Hammond v. Len-fest ON
OTHER TYPES OF MILITARY DETERMINATIONS

Because Hammond appeared to reject the strict view of both the
nonreviewability and exhaustion doctrines, it is viewed by many as
evidence of a more liberal attitude by federal courts toward interference with the military, and will inevitably be cited as authority for
permitting review of a wide variety of military determinations. The
holding of the case, however, is restricted to its facts, and whether it
will be applied by analogy to other areas is unclear.
The holding in Hammond has certain express limitations. First, in a
per curiam opinion the decision was modified on a petition for rehearing
and the case was sent back to the Department of the Navy to be
processed in accordance with newly issued regulations 2 2 dealing with
201 Subsequent decisions agreeing with Hammond have rejected the Noyd approach
and tended to consider the competing interests in ruling on the requirement of exhaustion. In In re Kelly, 401 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1968), petitioner sought a writ of
habeas corpus and stay of a court-martial for disobedience of orders, on the ground
that the Army had frustrated and failed properly to process and grant his application
for a conscientious objector discharge. The Fifth Circuit noted the split between the
Noyd and Hammond circuits, and sided with Hamnmond:
But we view the requirement of exhaustion as did the majority in Hammond.
We consider it to be based on principles of comity and not as an imperative
limitation of the scope of federal habeas corpus power.
401 F.2d at 213, accord, Cooper v. Barker, 291 F. Supp. 952 (D. Md. 1968); Gann v.
Wilson, 289 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Mandel v. Dayton, Civil No. 68-2695
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1968). However, the Fifth Circuit found that this was not a proper
case for the exercise of habeas corpus power since court-martial proceedings were already pending and the record did not clearly support the claim of "no basis in fact"
for denial.
202DOD Directive 1300.6 (May 10, 1968), see note 118 supra. It appears unlikely that the new right to appear before an officer of 0-3 or higher will make much
difference in the processing of conscientious objector cases. It will simply add one
more individual's recommendations to those of a chaplain, psychiatrist and commanding
officer. It does permit the applicant to present information to the officer and to be represented by a civilian attorney if desired, but it does not appear to be intended to
provide a hearing aimed at making determinations of fact since the department official
in the Pentagon still has full authority to make initial fact-findings and render conclusions of law. The provision for hearing before an officer appears to have been
added to the regulations as a stop-gap measure to meet some of the objections being
raised in federal suits against the insufficiency of conscientious objector review pro-
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conscientious objector discharges. 0 3 While this decision prevented Hammond's discharge, it remained consistent with the original opinion, for
it evidenced a willingness to accept jurisdiction over conscientious
discharge cases pending exhaustion of all available administrative remedies within the military.
Second, Hammond indicated that it was not altering the traditional

nonreviewability doctrine by distinguishing Noyd as a case attempting
to interfere with "duty assignments of persons lawfully in the armed
forces."

204

Although the distinction appears to be somewhat strained, 20 5

it permitted the court to avoid a holding directly contrary to Noyd, and
more importantly, to distinguish Orloff. It is understandable that a
circuit court would desire to avoid conflict with a decision as widely
accepted as Orloff, and by distinguishing that case it was actually able
to encroach upon Orloff's venerable doctrine. 200 Although Orloff
used rather broad language 20 7 and has been cited for still broader

notions of nonreviewability, its holding was that "it is not within
cedures and was not made with a view toward establishing an administrative system
with opportunities for plenary hearings and relief.
203 398 F.2d at 718. One month after the original Hammond opinion was decided, a
different Second Circuit panel in United States ex rel. Mankiewicz v. Ray, 399 F.2d
900 (2d Cir. 1968), ruled on another habeas corpus petition by a reservist seeking
review of a denial of his conscientious objector application by the Navy. The court
reversed the district court's denial of review, but remanded with instructions that Mankiewicz be reprocessed by the Navy under new DOD Directive procedures. This had
the effect of deferring court-martial proceedings which were pending until determination was made under the new procedures. Judge Friendly concurred in the reversal
but stated that he "would feel bound to object to an extension of Hammond . ..to
a case where a court-martial had already been convened and there was no adequate
showing that it would not consider Mankiewicz' defense." Id. at 902.
204 398 F.2d at 713.
205 There appears to be no basis for treating Noyd's suit to require assignment to
duties consistent with his beliefs as different from Hammond's suit to prevent activation which would result in assignment to duties inconsistent with his beliefs.
206 The expansion of review in discharge cases in the 1950's and 1960's was also accomplished without actually admitting to incursions on the nonreviewability doctrine..
Brucker type of discharge suit which sought alteraHowever, unlike the Harmon v,.
tion of records after discharge had been accomplished, or the court-martial review
cases like Burns v. Wilson which reviewed courts-martial proceedings after the fact,
Hammnond directly affected the status of personnel presently in the military. See also
Schwartz v. Covington, 341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965), enjoining issuance of undesirable
discharge and insuring present rank and status, pending petition to correction boards,
on grounds that petitioner had shown likelihood he would ultimately prevail, would
suffer irreparable injury if discharged (even if later reinstated) and there would be no
irreparable injury to the government.
207 See, e.g., text at note 65 supra.
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the power of this Court by habeas corpus to determine whether specific
assignments to duty fall within the basic classification of petitioner." 208
Indeed, there are cogent reasons why the courts should not review duty
assignments, which require considerable administrative discretion, 2 0
for if courts accepted such cases, every serviceman would be a potential
litigant, and review could result in virtual day-to-day court control
of the military. In contrast to this dilemma, however, court review of
denial of a conscientious objector discharge requires consideration of
only one basic factual determination which does not require substantial
administrative discretion-whether the applicant's beliefs are sincere.
Furthermore, there are a much smaller number of potential litigants, and
2 -10
court action, although it would interfere with military manpower,
would not interfere with day-to-day military operations. Thus, there
are practical reasons why the Orloff doctrine should not apply to conscientious objector discharge determinations. Such practical considerations clearly prompted the Hammond court to limit its original holding:
Specifically, we have not held that a decision based on military exigencies refusing to discharge a serviceman lawfully in the armed forces
-the situation that would have been presented, for example, if a soldier
on a battlefield during World War II had been refused a discharge because of the needs of the service-is subject to judicial review. The federal courts have neither appropriate judicial standards nor the capacity
211
for dealing with such questions.
It is difficult to ascertain precisely which elements mentioned by Judge
Kaufman-lawful status in the armed forces, a battlefield situation,
the existence of military exigencies-would make judicial review inappropriate. Surely Hammond was "lawfully in the armed forces" so
this consideration alone does not seem determinative. Apparently, the
court meant that only extreme situations involving battlefield conditions
or serious military exigencies would prevent court review of a military
-denial of a conscientious objector discharge.
Most of the recent suits involving the concepts of exhaustion or
nonreviewability have sought review of one of four types of military
determinations: duty assignments, denial of discharge, activation orders,
208 345 U.S. at 93.
209 345 U.S. at 94-95.
210 See note 206 supra.
211 398 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1968).
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or convening of courts-martial. The implications of Hammond will be
discussed with respect to each of these areas.

Duty Assignment Cases
Duty assignment cases prior to Hammond were generally dismissed on
2 12 for example,
grounds of nonreviewability. In Luftig v. McNamara,
an Army private sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the
Army from shipping him to Vietnam, asserting that American military
action there was illegal and unconstitutional and that there was no
lawful authority to assign him there. The district court dismissed on
the ground that review of political questions was beyond its jurisdiction. On appeal the D.C. Circuit affirmed, stating:
It is difficult to think of an area less suited for judicial action .... The
fundamental division of authority and power established by the Constitution precludes judges from overseeing the conduct of foreign
policy or the use and disposition of military power; these matters are
plainly the exclusive province of Congress and the Executive. 213
While cases of this type02 14 made it clear that direct attacks on the
legality or constitutionality of the war would not be heard by the
courts, plaintiffs have more recently relied, with limited success, on
other grounds. Thus, a lieutenant who was active in organizing a peace
march was granted a stay by Justice Douglas to prevent his sudden
shipment to Formosa,1 5 while another officer was granted a hearing,
but denied a temporary restraining order, when he sought to prevent
his shipment to Vietnam on the ground that under Army regulations
he had to be retained in his unit until a determination was made with
respect to his application for a conscientious objector discharge.2 16
Neither case, however, resulted in a merits determination on the
jurisdictional issue. In other recent suits the Orloff doctrine preventing
review of duty assignments has been held dispositive of the jurisdic212 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
213 M. at 665-66.
214A similar suit was brought in Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967), by three
soldiers ("The Fort Hood Three") just prior to their scheduled departure for Vietnam,
seeldng to enjoin the Secretary of Defense from carrying out their orders, and to
obtain a declaratory judgment that the United States military activity in Vietnam is
unlawful. After the circuit court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari, despite dissents by Justices Stewart and Douglas.
215 Smith v. Ritchey, 89 S. Ct.54 (1968).
210 Earl v. Cushman, Misc. Civil No. 68-1164-J (D. Mass. Dec. 18, 1968).
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tional issue. In Weber v. Clifford,2 17 a suit by a soldier with a history
of rheumatic fever, seeking to set aside Army orders for Vietnam, was
dismissed on the grounds that the district court had no jurisdiction to
review a determination made by Army doctors. Similarly, in MeAbee v.
Martinez, 18 the district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction
in a suit brought by members of an activated army reserve unit who
claimed they had not received adequate training for overseas duty
and sought to have orders for shipment to Vietnam enjoined on that
ground.
One suit, Noyd v. Bond,21 9 has successfully obtained district court
review of and relief from a duty assignment. After Captain Noyd
was convicted by a court-martial and sentenced to dismissal, total
forfeitures, and confinement at hard labor for one year, the convening
authority, following customary procedures, directed that he be transferred to the disciplinary barracks at Ft. Leavenworth. Noyd sought
a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the District of New
220
Mexico claiming that the order violated Article 71(c), UCMJ,
which provides that no sentence of a punitive discharge or one year's
confinement may be executed until affirmed by a board of review.
In Noyd v. Bond, the district court held that while it had no jurisdiction to determine the conditions of military confinement, under
habeas corpus it could test the legality of a present order, including
one involving a sentence to be served in the future. It also found
217 289 F. Supp. 960 (D. Md. 1968).
218 291 F. Supp. 77 (D. Md.), injunctive relief denied, 393 U.S. 904 (1968). In Martinez
the principal claim was that the overseas orders violated Army regulations (AR 612-35)
requiring certain types of training before overseas deployment, and requiring removal
of personnel "not qualified to perform duties" in their MOS (job category) from units
being shipped overseas. The district court dismissed on the grounds that the Army
rather than the courts should determine MOS qualifications since court review would
require testimony of witnesses from widely divergent areas of the world, and that
petitioners had not exhausted their administrative remedies through the Inspector
General Complaints System (AR 20-1, ch. 3). This requirement that a serviceman
seek relief through the Inspector General (an officer in each command who acts as a
sort of ombudsman for hearing of grievances and complaints) seems particularly unsuitable to the exhaustion doctrine, since the Inspector General has no power to provide
a remedy for an individual. He merely constitutes another time-consuming and probably inefficacious step before genuine remedies can be sought.
219 285 F. Supp. 785 (D.N.M. 1968).
220The Government contended that since under Article 57(b), UCMJ, the period
of confinement runs from the date of sentence, immediate confinement is authorized.
The court, however, found that Article 71(c) is an exception to Article 57(b). Id. at
787.
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that due to the Air Force's determination to execute the sentence, the
military process was ineffective to protect petitioner's rights and so
adequate grounds existed for not applying the exhaustion of remedies
requirement 21 The Tenth Circuit reversed, 222 holding that because the

case was pending before a board of review, Noyd had not exhausted
his military appellate remedies. The court further stated that the Court
of Military Appeals had power to grant habeas corpus relief under
these circumstances.2 2 The problem with this analysis is that a board
of review determines only those issues relevant to the court-martial, 22,
and it is unlikely that it would review or grant relief of claims con-

cerning the conditions of incarceration imposed after completion of
a court-martial. The contention that the Court of Military Appeals
could grant relief and therefore provide a remedy which must be
exhausted is also tenuous. Despite recent assertions by the CMA

concerning its extraordinary relief powers225 aimed at broadening
221 See Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969), where review and relief were
granted despite failure to utilize the right to make a complaint under Article 138 and
through the Inspector General because the commanding officer had indicated that there
were no other remedies. But see Levy v. Dillon, 286 F. Supp. 593 (D. Kan. 1968), which
declined to follow Noyd and denied release, on habeas corpus, from disciplinary barracks and relief from allegedly improper treatment, despite the fact that appeal to a
board of review was not completed, on grounds, inter alia, that petitioner had not
exhausted his military remedies by making complaint to his commander under Article
138, UCMJ, and that Article 71(c) was not applicable because, until affirmance by a
board of review, sentence has not been "executed."
222 402 F.2d 441 (10th Cir. 1968).
22
3 The court cited Levy v. Resor, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 37 C.M.R. 399 (1967), which
stated that it could grant extraordinary relief but rejected petitioner's request for bail
on the grounds that servicemen have no constitutional right to bail. See also Levy v.
Resor, 384 F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1967) (per curiam), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1049 (1968)
(denial of subsequent application for habeas corpus to procure release on bail and
grant of application by government to move petitioner to disciplinary barracks at
Ft. Leavenworth upheld on review).
224

Art. 66, UCMJ.

In Gale v. United States, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 40, 37 C.M.R. 304 (1967), the Court of
Military Appeals declared that it possesses "all writ" powers and could exercise, by
means of extraordinary remedies, general supervisory control over military justice.
See also United States v. Frischholz, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 150, 36 C.M.R. 306 (1966). In
United States v. Bevilacqua, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 10, 39 C.M.R. 10 (1968), involving a petition
to the CMA for writ of error coram nobis by petitioners who had been convicted in
a special court-martial which did not meet the requirements of Article 67, UCMJ, for
court review, the court stated that although its jurisdiction regarding direct appeals was
conditioned by Article 67, that Article does not describe the full panoply of its powers
and that Congress intended it to have power to grant relief on an extraordinary basis
when an accused has been palpably deprived of his constitutional rights in a military
trial.
22.5
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its powers under the Uniform Code of Military Justice,- 6 that tribunal
is vested only with the power to review court-martial convictions.2 27
There remains considerable confusion as to the extent of its powers
and the adequacy of the CMA as a remedy in many circumstances. 2 s
Early in 1969, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Noyd v.
Bond.229 In granting non-incarcerated status Justice Douglas stated
that the suit does not challenge purported error in a court-martial, which
would require that court-martial appeal remedies first be exhausted,
but that it raised questions as to whether exhaustion of remedies applies
in cases where it is claimed that court-martial authorities acted beyond
their authority.s ° Furthermore, he noted that it presents questions as
to the scope of review of the Court of Military Appeals. The case thus
involves important questions concerning the nonreviewability and exhaustion of remedies doctrines in relation to military orders. Justice
Douglas has already expressed the opinion, in his dissent in Morse v.
Boswell zs ' that Orloff is limited to the case where the military has acted
226 There is indeed good reason for the CMA to attempt to broaden its powers, for
the unavailability of extraordinary remedies within the military system has caused
many petitioners to seek relief in federal courts. See notes 6-14, 66 supra and accompanying text.
227 Art. 67, UCMJ.
228 Despite its assertions of expanded relief powers the CMA almost universally denies
extraordinary relief. This author's examination of the Miscellaneous Docket, United
States Court of Military Appeals shows:
Dismissed for Jurisdiction
Lack of
Granted, but
Suits Filed
Jurisdiction Relief Denied Relief Granted

1966a
1967
1968
1969d

2
24
20
6e

2
7
6

14
13

1

3

3b

le

a The docket was established in October, 1966.
b The three cases, United States v. Board of Review #2, #1, #4, 17 U.S.C.M.A.
150, 37 C.M.R. 414 (1967), sought relief, on habeas corpus, where there had
been command influence. The court returned the cases to the boards for disposition in accordance with United States v. BuBay, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 147, 37
C.M.R. 411 (1967).
c Jones v. Ignatius, Misc. No. 68-14, holding, on motion for extraordinary relief,
that commutation of special court-martial sentence by convening authority to
11 months confinement at hard labor was beyond jurisdiction of special courtmartial.
d Through March 6, 1969.
e 2 cases pending without determination.
229 89 S. Ct. 692 (1969).
230 89 S. Ct. 478 (1968).
231 393 U.S. 802, 809 (1968).
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within its powers in denying petitioner an assignment, and does not
apply where it acts without such power. However, Noyd v. Bond
is not a typical assignment or order case because the order to confinement is closely related to court-martial proceedings, and disposition of
convicted servicemen is governed by the UCMJ, unlike the normal
case involving duty assignment where the military's authority is highly
discretionary and therefore less likely to be disturbed. z 2 Nevertheless,
the Noyd case still raises doubts regarding the absoluteness of the nonreviewability doctrine as applied to military orders, and raises the possibility of a general movement toward court review of orders involving
abuse of authority-orders issued in an arbitrary or discriminatory
manner, or intended to prevent exercise of first amendment rights, or
in clear violation of military regnlations.-

CasesInvolving Denial of Discharge
The few post-Hammond suits seeking review of a denial of discharge
have similarly been dismissed on grounds of nonreviewability. In
Rank v. Gleszer, 3 for example, a National Guard member was denied
a writ of habeas corpus to require his discharge for physical unfitness
on the grounds that the statutory provisions governing discharge gave
the appropriate Secretary discretionary authority and, absent compelling considerations such as a first amendment claim or a claim
that the military exceeded its authority, the courts will permit the
military "to solve its own problems within its administrative system."
The Rank court also noted that petitioner had not exhausted his
administrative remedies within the military. The exhaustion doctrine
is particularly confused in the area of administrative discharges because
the administrative scheme is often not clearly defined, and thus it is
often uncertain what authority each of the relevant boards and individuals possess.23r Furthermore, since an administrative discharge is con22See
Arnheiter v. Ignatius, No. 48414 (N.D. Cal. 1968), quoted in 115 Cong. Rec.
E 545-50 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1969), where the district court refused to intercede in the
removal of an officer from command of a destroyer escort. The court stated that although Burns and Harmon had relaxed the traditional nonreviewability rule, neither
court-martial, punitive action nor demotion were involved in the instant case, and thus
judicial review was not appropriate for "such purely internal, administrative matters as
duty assignment and promotion." However, the court declined to rest its holding on
nonreviewability and denied relief on the merits.
233 288 F. Supp. 174 (D. Colo. 1968).
234 Id. at 175.
235 See, e.g., id. at 176 (expressing uncertainty concerning the significance of de-
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sidered a discretionary action in the best interests of the service, W 6 there
is no precedent for court review of military refusal to discharge a
serviceman who claims grounds for discharge, such as minority, dependency or hardship, physical or mental disability, or unsuitability or
unfitness. However, when a refusal to take administrative discharge
action or to grant a discharge involves arbitrariness or discrimination,
a first amendment claim, or violation of military authority or regulations, there would seem to be reason for permitting court review once
the serviceman has exhausted all hope of relief from the military
7
authoritiesY.-

Suits Involving Activation Orders
A number of suits seeking-review of activation orders were filed by
terminations by such administrative tribunals as Physical Evaluation Board, Physical
Review Council, and Physical Disability Appeal Board).
236 See DOD Directive 1332.14, pt. V, para. A; AR 635-212 (Personnel Separations:
Discharge, Unfitness & Unsuitability), para. 10 (unit commander will recommend
whether action for discharge, disposition through medical channels, or disciplinary
action should be initiated); AR 635-40 (Physical Evaluation for Retention, Retirement
or Separation); AR 635-200 (Personnel Separations: Enlisted Personnel). For Congressional investigation into criticisms of the administrative discharge system, see Joint
Hearings,supra note 103, at 769-836.
237 When a serviceman seeks release from the military by habeas corpus, not on the
grounds that he is entitled to a discharge, but that he was unlawfully inducted, see
text at notes 31-35 supra, there are different exhaustion considerations. The services
have provided procedures for dealing with servicemen who claim wrongful induction.
For example, AR 635-200, ch. 5, Sec. III, para. 5-5, permits application for discharge
through military channels for "an individual claiming erroneous induction because of
denial of a procedural right." Cases have held that a serviceman must exhaust his inservice remedies, even if claiming unlawful induction, Pickens v. Cox, 282 F.2d 784
(10th Cir. 1960); United States ex rel. Tomback v. Bullock, 110 F. Supp. 698 (N.D.
II. 1953). On the other hand, there is authority that since the military lacks valid
jurisdiction over one wrongfully inducted, he need not exhaust in-service remedies,
United States ex rel. Ursitti v. Baird, 39 F. Supp. 872 (E.D.N.Y. 1941). A number of decisions have granted habeas corpus relief, despite failure to exhaust inservice remedies, without raising the exhaustion issue. E.g., Powers v. Powers, 400 F.2d
438 (5th Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. Wilkerson v. Commanding Officer, 286 F.
Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States ex rel. Caputo v. Sharp, 282 F. Supp. 362
(ED. Pa. 1968). The issue is currently being litigated in a case pending before the
District of Massachusetts, involving an application for writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that the Army violated its regulations in failing to give proper medical examination and consideration at induction to an inductee with a history of hypertension who
had been wrongly classified 1-A. The government argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because of petitioner's failure to exhaust remedies under AR 635-200 and the
Selective Service System, and argued further that the inductee had waived any alleged
induction procedural irregularities. Gross v. Commanding Officer, Misc. Civil No.
68-79-J (D. Mass. 1968).
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members of reserve and national guard units activated during the 1968
call-ups. Except for stay orders issued by Justice Douglas 8 and temporary restraining orders issued by some lower courts,2 9 the activation
orders were upheld. However, jurisdiction was generally accepted by
the district courts and the determinations made on the merits. In
Morse v. Boswell,240 113 members of an activated reserve unit sought
to prevent assignment overseas and to cancel activation on the grounds
that the statute under which they were activated, 41 passed after they
had entered their enlistment contracts, violated those contracts and
violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution and the doctrine
of separation of powers. The Government did not contest jurisdiction
and the claim was heard and rejected on the merits. Since these suits
attacked the constitutionality of a federal statute, and there was no
administrative scheme providing further remedies for appeal, the grant
of jurisdiction would seem correct.
Another type of activation suit, challenging the activation of individual reservists, has experienced basic jurisdictional problems. Three
recent Second Circuit decisions, each decided by a different panel,
have dealt with these problems. Fox v. Brown was an action by an
Air National Guard reservist to annul an order directing him to report
for active duty because of his unsatisfactory attendance at reserve
meetings. Relying upon Orloff and distinguishing Hammond, the court
held that there was no justiciable claim within its jurisdiction because the
suit sought review of acts of military discretion which affected the
status of persons in the armed forces. It indicated, however, that review
is permissible to determine whether the military had acted within its
jurisdiction under valid law,2 43 and might be permissible in cases involv238 See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 57 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1968);
Smith v. Ritchey, 89 S. Ct. 54 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1968).
239A Temporary Restraining Order was granted by the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California in Sofen v. McNamara, Civil No. 68-239-AAH (1968);
Frohmuth v. United States, Civil No. 68-571-WAVPG (1968); Most v. United States,
Civil No. 68-886-PH (1968); All v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 530 (C.D. Cal. 1968). Gion
v. McNamara, Civil No. 68-986-S (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1968), held that involuntary activation
pursuant to 10 U.S.C-A. § 263 (Supp. 1969), violated the enlistment contract and the
Constitution and ordered the activation rescinded.
240 289 F. Supp. 812 (D. Md.),
aff'd, 401 F.2d 544 (4th Cir.), stay denied,
393 U.S. 802 (1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 687 (1969). Cf. Pfile v. Corcoran, 287 F.
Supp. 554 (D. Colo. 1968).
24110 U.S.C.A. § 263 (Supp. 1969).
242402 F.2d 837 (2d Cir.), aff'g 286 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
243Id. at 840, citing Winters v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd
per curian, 390 F.2d 879 (2d Cir.), stay denied, 391 U.S. 910, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 896
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ing administrative decisions which had a chilling effect on first amendment rights.' A second decision, United States ex rel. Schonbrun v.
Commanding Officer,2 5 involved a reservist's petition for writ of habeas
corpus to prevent his activation on the grounds of "extreme personal
and community hardship." 246 While the court expressed uncertainty as
to whether habeas corpus could be used to attack activation,247 it ruled
that mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361 is available in such a
situation if the military has not acted within its jurisdiction and the
official conduct goes "far beyond any rational exercise of discretion. "248 The court found, however, that violation by the Army of its
own regulations did not in this case prejudice the petitioner and denied
review because of the need for expedition in the administration of
military personnel and for avoidance of undue court interference. In
a third decision, Smith v. Resor,249 Judge Kaufman refused to review
the "discretionary orders" activating an Army reservist who had been
given unsatisfactory ratings for attendance at reserve meetings because
he had long hair. However, he ruled that since Army regulations permit
long hair if it contributes to one's civilian livelihood (petitioner played
in a musical group), and since the record of the case clearly showed
that at several crucial stages the Army failed to follow its own procedures and safeguards, the case should be sent back to the Army with
orders that the petitioner be permitted "fully to avail himself of the
procedures the Army has established for review .

," 250

These cases appear to present attempts by the Second Circuit to find
a workable approach to the extension of Hammond. Since different
panels have decided the cases there is less uniformity and continuity
than there might be. Thus, despite the functional interest-balancing
approach to reviewability and exhaustion which first appeared in
(1968). But see Quaid v. United States, 386 F.2d 25 (10th Cir. 1967) (delinquent reservist
entitled to have local board investigate claim of conscientious objection before induction), distinguished, Even v. Clifford, 287 F. Supp. 334, 337-38 (1968).
244 402 F.2d at 840.
245 403 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1968), reconsideration of denial of stay denied, 89 S. Ct.
609 (1969).
246 Id. at 372.
24

7The court stated that habeas corpus cannot be used to test the conditions of
lawful custody except where challenging the legality of a change from probation or
parole to imprisonment. It expressed uncertainty as to whether activation falls within
this exception. Id. at 374.
248 Id.
249
Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969).
0 Id. at 145-46.
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Hammond, reliance on absolute statements of nonreviewability continue to crop up, such as the statement in Fox that the courts lack
jurisdiction to review acts of military discretion or to affect the status
of military personnel. Nevertheless, the cases indicate that where the
administrative action exceeds legal authority2 5 1 or is "beyond any
rational exercise of discretion" 2 2 or has a chilling effect on first
amendment rights, 253 review may be permissible. These factors must, of
course, be weighed against the military's interest in accomplishing a
rapid and efficient call-up of reserves or in maintaining an effective
reserve program by use of punitive activation for delinquent reservists.
The degree of interference with the military will necessarily differ
according to variables such as the type of military action involved and
the status of the reservist. For example, court review of the punitive
activation of a reservist who claims that his orders violate military regulations would involve less interference with the military than the
review of activation of an entire unit. Infringement on individual
rights might also be of less consequence in the unit activation since
such a wholesale activation is an accepted and omnipresent threat for
4
a reservist. While the fear that the courts will be flooded with suitses
continues to impede adoption of a more liberal review policy, it is
clear that the Orloff doctrine of nonreviewability is no longer an
absolute.

Suits to Enjoin Courts-Martial
Suits to enjoin the military from holding a court-martial have been
unsuccessful, primarily because of failure to exhaust military remedies.
In Gorko v. Commanding Offlcer,2 the Tenth Circuit refused a writ
of habeas corpus to prevent the military from trying petitioner a
second time following the reversal of his first conviction:
Exhaustion of all available military remedies is required before reliance
may be had on habeas corpus. The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that no person, without his consent, may be tried a
second time for the same offense. The adequacy and availability of
251 See text at note 243 supra.
252
2 53

See text at note 248 supra.

See text at note 244 supra.
54 See United States ex rel Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371, 375 (2d
Cir. 1968).
255 314 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1963).
2
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the military remedy is not questioned. Consideration of the question
25 6
by the courts is, accordingly, premature.
Other attempts to enjoin a court-martial have relied for authority on
Dombrowski v. Pfister.5 7 In Levy v. McNamara,28 for example, the
plaintiff sought to prevent the military from bringing him to trial for
activities allegedly protected by the first amendment. Although the
suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, it would appear that such
a case involves many of the same considerations which led the Supreme
Court in Dombrowski to interfere with the autonomy of the state
courts by enjoining prosecutions which would have a chilling effect on
the right of expression. Indeed, as the traditional view of the autonomy
of the military continues to change, extension of Dombrowski to the
military appears appropriate.
Likewise, under a Hammond interest-balancing approach, there are
compelling reasons for court review of the administrative decision to
convene a court-martial when it is in clear violation of statutory authority, military regulations, or constitutional rights. Recent conscientious objector discharge suits have successfully prevented courts-martial
by granting relief from prior administrative determinations denying
conscientious objector discharges. Courts have ordered that pending
court-martial proceedings be deferred until final administrative determination regarding discharge has been made,2 59 and have ordered a peti260
tioner discharged as a conscientious objector despite pending offenses
and court-martial proceedings.2 61 Nevertheless, hesitancy to interfere
256 Id. at 860.
257 380 U.S. 479

(1965). See note 146 supra.
Civil No. 953-67 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub norn. Levy v. Corcoran, 389 F.2d 929 (D.C.
Cir.), stay denied, 387 U.S. 915, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 960 (1967). A similar suit to
prevent the court-martial of 25 soldiers for mutiny who had staged a peaceful stockade
sit-down strike was taken under advisement and the courts-martial permitted to be
held. Hallinan v. Secretary, described in N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1968, at 23, co. 6;
Jan. 25, 1969, at 56, col. 6.
259 United States ex rel. Mankiewicz v. Ray, 399 F.2d 900 (2d Cit. 1968).
260 Crane v. Hedrick, 284 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
261 Cooper v. Barker, 291 F. Supp 952 (D. Md. 1968). Although there had been no
final administrative determination on petitioner's application for conscientious objector
discharge and court-martial charges of AWOL and refusal of an order to put on a
uniform were pending, the court found that "the Navy was refusing to complete
processing and was insisting instead that court-martial proceedings of petitioner be completed first" and in view of these circumstances, the Court held that "there has been no
failure by petitioner in this case to exhaust his available administrative remedies because
the Navy has refused to permit him to do so." 291 F. Supp. at 959.
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with the military's judicial system remains a serious obstruction to court
injunctions against the holding of courts-martial.
In summary, it is likely that the availability of federal court review
of the above types of military determinations will continue to depend
upon narrow exceptions to the nonreviewability rule. There are precedents for permitting review of and relief from certain military determinations when a challenge is made regarding the constitutionality of an
act of Congress, 20 2 when the military is acting "far afield of its statutory
powers," 203 far beyond any rational exericse of discretion264 or in violation of its own regulations, 265 and when first amendment rights are involvedYa66 These categories embody considerations of policy, and to the
extent that they permit a functional analysis of the circumstances involved in an individual case, they should provide a salutary extension of
court review of military determinations.
CONCLUSION

During the Vietnam War, the exhaustion of remedies doctrine has
undergone a tortured development in relation to court review of military determinations. The rejection of the strict rule of Noyd v.
McNamaraby the Second Circuit in Hammond v. Lenfest seems to have
restored the doctrine's appropriate function in the legal process. As
the absoluteness of the nonreviewability doctrine continues to wane,
the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, applied as a discretionary measure
to prevent premature review, should permit proper judicial consideration of the competing interests of the litigants. Because the profusion of military administrative channels continues to cause confusion
in determining whether an alleged remedy is adequate, courts must
examine such remedies carefully in making that determination. If
the courts continue to show increased acceptance of functional stand262 Gallagher v. Quinn, 363 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881 (1966).
263

Robson v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 631, 633 (E.D. Pa. 1968), which states that

military determinations may be upset "when the integrity of the fact-finding process
has been destroyed by the gross lack of due process," id., citing Ashe v. McNamara,
355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965).
264 United States ex rel. Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371, 374 (2d Cir.
1968) (dicta), reconsiderationof denial of stay denied, 89 S. Ct. 609 (1969).
265 Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969); Noyd v. Bond, 402 F.2d 441 (10th Cir.),
non-incarceratedstatus granted, 89 S. Ct. 478 (1968), cert. granted, 89 S. Ct. 692 (1969).
266 Smith v. Ritchey, 89 S. Ct. 54 (1968); Fox v. Brown, 402 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1968),
aff'g 286 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (dicta).
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ards for determining the applicability of both reviewability and exhaustion, the result should be less arbitrariness in military determinations
and greater responsiveness of both military and civilian courts to
protection of the rights of servicemen.

